Trade Wars and Tariffs

The business took the risk. Many couldnt pass on the tariffs. But hey, get in line with all the other socialist crap being peddled.

Elizabeth Warren just proves my point. If she's for it, Im 99% certain Im against it.

Thanks!

My sister had a class taught by Liz at Texas. She said that EW was a POS and treated the female law students horribly.
 
They had a choice to raise prices and make their usual profit and pass on the tariffs OR eat the tariffs and have less profit per sale, not any profit per sale.
The left said they passed the cost on to consumers. If not, they ate the profit which the left said they were not doing. In the end, IF IF there is any refunds made that is $175 billion being taken away from the taxpayers and given to some...shall I say greedy business owners who most likely do not deserve any refund.
It is so delicious to see you pounding the desk on tariffs paid by companies and consumers after all of that Trump water you carried claiming it never happened 🤡

“Greedy business owners”… how does socialism taste 😂
 
Here’s a clear, law-focused answer to your question about whether **Trump’s new Section 122 tariffs** are *illegal because most countries don’t have “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits with the United States*:

* [The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/20/trump-tariff-scotus-response?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-will-raise-global-tariff-rate-10-15-2026-02-21/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/20/trump-supreme-court-tariffs-ruling?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [PolitiFact](https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/maga-meter-tracking-donald-trumps-2024-promises/promise/1626/add-a-tariff-of-10-to-20-to-all-nondomestic-goods/article/3252/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

---

## 📌 What Section 122 *Actually* Says

Under **Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974**, the President *may* impose a temporary import surcharge (up to 15% for up to 150 days) only when:

1. **A “fundamental international payments problem” exists**, and
2. Such a surcharge is *required* to deal with **large and serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficits** (or one of two other specified conditions like preventing a major depreciation of the dollar or cooperating with other countries to address a global imbalance).

That language is **very specific** — it’s not a general tariff authority. It was never used before, and courts haven’t interpreted it in detail because it hasn’t been tested.

---

## 🧾 Trump Administration’s Legal Justification

The White House issued a proclamation finding that:

* The U.S. currently runs *large and serious* balance-of-payments deficits (citing the current account and components like the trade deficit and primary income).
* Therefore, a surcharge under Section 122 is authorized.([The White House][1])

This justification focuses on **the overall U.S. balance-of-payments position**, not on individual countries’ balances with the U.S.

---

## 📊 Key Legal Objection: Does Section 122 Apply at All?

Many legal scholars and economists argue that:

### ⚖️ 1. The U.S. Does *Not* Have a Balance-of-Payments Deficit

Critics note that the U.S. *current account deficit* (which includes the trade deficit) is **offset by a surplus in the capital account** (foreign investment into the U.S.). So the **overall balance-of-payments is *not* in deficit** under standard macroeconomic definitions. That means Section 122’s trigger may not truly exist.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

* Under modern floating exchange rates (which the U.S. has had since the 1970s), a country doesn’t run a “balance-of-payments deficit” in the same sense as under fixed-rate regimes — foreign capital inflows automatically finance current account shortfalls.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

### ⚖️ 2. Section 122 Has *Never Been Used or Interpreted*

Because Section 122 has never been invoked before, there is no judicial precedent about what constitutes a “large and serious balance-of-payments deficit.” This means the courts might have to interpret it if it’s challenged.

### ⚖️ 3. Critics Argue the Statute May Be Obsolete

Some experts suggest the statutory language makes sense only under a fixed exchange rate — a context that no longer exists — and so Section 122 might not legally apply to modern trade deficits.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

---

## 🧠 Does It Matter That *Other Countries* Don’t Have Deficits With the U.S.?

**No — under Section 122, individual balance-of-payments relationships with specific countries are *not* relevant.**
What matters (in the statutory language) is the **overall U.S. balance-of-payments situation** — and *not* whether, for example, Mexico or the EU has a surplus or deficit with the United States. The statute doesn’t require each partner country to have a “large and serious” deficit. It simply says that *if the U.S. is facing a fundamental payments problem, the President may impose surcharges*.

So the legal question isn’t *Are other countries running deficits with the U.S.?* but *Is the U.S. experiencing the kind of balance-of-payments problem that the statute anticipates?*

---

## ⚖️ Bottom Line: Legal Status Is Uncertain — Not Clearly Illegal *Just* Because of Deficit Data

**Argument that they *violate the law***
Critics (including economists and some trade lawyers) argue Section 122 *cannot* be lawfully invoked because:

* Standard economic accounting shows the U.S. does **not** have an overall balance-of-payments deficit.
* Section 122’s conditions are narrow and specific.
* The statute has never been judicially tested, so its precise triggers are unclear.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

**Argument that they are *lawful***
Supporters (including the administration) contend:

* The statute *on its face* authorizes temporary tariffs if the President finds a “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficit exists.
* The White House has made such a finding based on current account data.([The White House][1])
* The courts may defer to the executive’s factual determination if challenged.

If this goes to court (which is likely), judges will have to interpret Section 122’s requirements and whether the U.S.’s modern balance-of-payments condition satisfies them.

---

## 📌 Summary

**So do Trump’s new Section 122 tariffs *violate the law because most countries don’t have “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits with the U.S.?**

* **No —** Section 122 doesn’t measure tariffs on a *country-by-country basis*.
* **The real legal debate** is whether the overall U.S. balance-of-payments deficit satisfies the statute’s requirements — a point on which economists and lawyers strongly disagree.
* **The statute is untested**, so a legal challenge would likely raise this as a central issue.

---

If you’d like, I can explain how courts interpret similar statutory standards (e.g., “public interest” findings), or break down **how economists define balance-of-payments deficits** in this context.

[1]: Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems "Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems – The White House"
[2]: Guest Post: President Trump Cannot Legally Impose Tariffs Using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 "Guest Po
st: President Trump Cannot Legally Impose Tariffs Using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974"
 
Here’s a clear, law-focused answer to your question about whether **Trump’s new Section 122 tariffs** are *illegal because most countries don’t have “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits with the United States*:

* [The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/20/trump-tariff-scotus-response?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-will-raise-global-tariff-rate-10-15-2026-02-21/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/20/trump-supreme-court-tariffs-ruling?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* [PolitiFact](https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/maga-meter-tracking-donald-trumps-2024-promises/promise/1626/add-a-tariff-of-10-to-20-to-all-nondomestic-goods/article/3252/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

---

## 📌 What Section 122 *Actually* Says

Under **Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974**, the President *may* impose a temporary import surcharge (up to 15% for up to 150 days) only when:

1. **A “fundamental international payments problem” exists**, and
2. Such a surcharge is *required* to deal with **large and serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficits** (or one of two other specified conditions like preventing a major depreciation of the dollar or cooperating with other countries to address a global imbalance).

That language is **very specific** — it’s not a general tariff authority. It was never used before, and courts haven’t interpreted it in detail because it hasn’t been tested.

---

## 🧾 Trump Administration’s Legal Justification

The White House issued a proclamation finding that:

* The U.S. currently runs *large and serious* balance-of-payments deficits (citing the current account and components like the trade deficit and primary income).
* Therefore, a surcharge under Section 122 is authorized.([The White House][1])

This justification focuses on **the overall U.S. balance-of-payments position**, not on individual countries’ balances with the U.S.

---

## 📊 Key Legal Objection: Does Section 122 Apply at All?

Many legal scholars and economists argue that:

### ⚖️ 1. The U.S. Does *Not* Have a Balance-of-Payments Deficit

Critics note that the U.S. *current account deficit* (which includes the trade deficit) is **offset by a surplus in the capital account** (foreign investment into the U.S.). So the **overall balance-of-payments is *not* in deficit** under standard macroeconomic definitions. That means Section 122’s trigger may not truly exist.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

* Under modern floating exchange rates (which the U.S. has had since the 1970s), a country doesn’t run a “balance-of-payments deficit” in the same sense as under fixed-rate regimes — foreign capital inflows automatically finance current account shortfalls.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

### ⚖️ 2. Section 122 Has *Never Been Used or Interpreted*

Because Section 122 has never been invoked before, there is no judicial precedent about what constitutes a “large and serious balance-of-payments deficit.” This means the courts might have to interpret it if it’s challenged.

### ⚖️ 3. Critics Argue the Statute May Be Obsolete

Some experts suggest the statutory language makes sense only under a fixed exchange rate — a context that no longer exists — and so Section 122 might not legally apply to modern trade deficits.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

---

## 🧠 Does It Matter That *Other Countries* Don’t Have Deficits With the U.S.?

**No — under Section 122, individual balance-of-payments relationships with specific countries are *not* relevant.**
What matters (in the statutory language) is the **overall U.S. balance-of-payments situation** — and *not* whether, for example, Mexico or the EU has a surplus or deficit with the United States. The statute doesn’t require each partner country to have a “large and serious” deficit. It simply says that *if the U.S. is facing a fundamental payments problem, the President may impose surcharges*.

So the legal question isn’t *Are other countries running deficits with the U.S.?* but *Is the U.S. experiencing the kind of balance-of-payments problem that the statute anticipates?*

---

## ⚖️ Bottom Line: Legal Status Is Uncertain — Not Clearly Illegal *Just* Because of Deficit Data

**Argument that they *violate the law***
Critics (including economists and some trade lawyers) argue Section 122 *cannot* be lawfully invoked because:

* Standard economic accounting shows the U.S. does **not** have an overall balance-of-payments deficit.
* Section 122’s conditions are narrow and specific.
* The statute has never been judicially tested, so its precise triggers are unclear.([Int'l Econ Law & Policy Blog][2])

**Argument that they are *lawful***
Supporters (including the administration) contend:

* The statute *on its face* authorizes temporary tariffs if the President finds a “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficit exists.
* The White House has made such a finding based on current account data.([The White House][1])
* The courts may defer to the executive’s factual determination if challenged.

If this goes to court (which is likely), judges will have to interpret Section 122’s requirements and whether the U.S.’s modern balance-of-payments condition satisfies them.

---

## 📌 Summary

**So do Trump’s new Section 122 tariffs *violate the law because most countries don’t have “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits with the U.S.?**

* **No —** Section 122 doesn’t measure tariffs on a *country-by-country basis*.
* **The real legal debate** is whether the overall U.S. balance-of-payments deficit satisfies the statute’s requirements — a point on which economists and lawyers strongly disagree.
* **The statute is untested**, so a legal challenge would likely raise this as a central issue.

---

If you’d like, I can explain how courts interpret similar statutory standards (e.g., “public interest” findings), or break down **how economists define balance-of-payments deficits** in this context.

[1]: Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems "Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems – The White House"
[2]: Guest Post: President Trump Cannot Legally Impose Tariffs Using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 "Guest Po
st: President Trump Cannot Legally Impose Tariffs Using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974"
does anybody read this?
 
Not sure it's been pointed out, but two things about Trump using this law where he can initiate tariffs for 150 days:

- if they execute the law correctly, it will be a 10% tariff on everything, including previous exceptions, like microchips. It actually might be worse to have a 10% tariff on everything than a system where we exchange a favorable tariff rate for a gold bar gift to King Trump.

- Importers are going to defer what they can for 150 days.
 
Some said that companies passed the costs to consumers, ie inflation, so dont see how one can makecase for companies being reimbursed.

If I raised rents because of an erroneous property tax increase and a new, willing renter agreed to pay the higher rental rate, do I have to reimburse them when I get the erroneous increase removed?
 
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it is all theoretical. sometimes life isnt fair.

The end consumer ultimately and willingly made the choice to pay x for y.

The business was forced to absorb the erroneous charge and had all the risk in the transaction. In capitalism, the profit element remains with the one with the risk. A lot of businesses could only pass a small portion through or they incurred significant costs to tweak their supply chains to get around a legally dubious charge...
 
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The end consumer ultimately and willingly made the choice to pay x for y.

The business was forced to absorb the erroneous charge and had all the risk in the transaction. In capitalism, the profit element remains with the one with the risk. A lot of businesses could only pass a small portion through or they incurred significant costs to tweak their supply chains to get around a legally dubious charge...
Businesses are impacted everyday by gov decisions. There is no way one can determine losses incurred. Besides, I was told the costs were absorbed by the consumer.
 
Im not even anti-tariff per se. But yeah, Im against gutting the Constitution through a blatant executive overreach. .
Focused tariffs have a purpose. I’m all for sticking it to China as much as we can without screwing ourselves. However a broad brush common tariff value on every trading partner is absolutely moronic.
 
Businesses are impacted everyday by gov decisions. There is no way one can determine losses incurred. Besides, I was told the costs were absorbed by the consumer.

In this case, the loss is very easy to determine. The importers paid the illegal tariff through an electronic filing system. They know exactly how much they paid and when.
 
I think that in principle its a good thing that tarrif $ could be used to reduce the debt. My complaint is in dressing up what amounts to a tax increase for that purpose into something else. Just call it what it is. Say we are increasing taxes to pay off the debt. Then be accountable.
 

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