SamRebel35
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The book that might end every discussion on Volnation.
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I actually gave my copy of the book away yesterday or I would cite the statistics they gave. Their conclusion, from memory, was that winning a superbowl requires either a great offense or a great defense, or both.
The winning team has had what the author's defined as a "great" offense 51% of the time, and a "great" defense 49% of the time, and both something like 20% of the time (don't quote those numbers, I will be close but not exact). It does go into some discussion of that very issue, and Mathletics actually does go into some detail about the importance of scoring defense. The authors in Scorecasting simply insist that their data suggest that while defense is important, it isn't more important than a great offense, and maybe less so (and includes discussions of the NBA and other sports).
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Oh, I can be extremely condescending, that is one of my many, many, flaws. Me being condescending, however, doesn't make anyone else less so. Condescension is not a humanity wide zero sum personality trait.
Confirmation bias? Sure, most all of us suffer from it to some extent, and that is something I am aware of and try to mitigate. In my view, the truly scary people are those who don't know that they suffer from it.
But again I stress that I am not arguing for the authors of this book. I am not their agent, nor their attorney. If you have a beef take it up with them. At a minimum, take in the data BEFORE you draw your conclusion.
If you won't read it, what are you really arguing for? Isn't that the purest form of confirmation bias? You know, not even taking in new information because you are so set in your view?
It would be like watching the trailer for "Gravity" and saying you won't watch it because you don't think the physics are realistic enough, and then arguing the story-line with someone who saw it. Maybe you've created an artificial barrier to keep you from what could be a great experience?
I can't speak for why economists who can run predictive analysis won't coach football. It might be because they don't like interacting with people, and that is part of the coach's function. Or maybe it is because they feel that it isn't enough of a challenge. If they developed the right risk management software, it wouldn't even require thinking, at least not to come up with a mathematically optimal decision (as I've said before, risk management software like that does exist, and has found some limited use on the sidelines). Or maybe, football is so entrenched in tradition (see any conversation about uniforms on this site as an example) that there are too many barriers to entrance for someone who didn't come up through "normal" channels. I presume it would be exceedingly difficult to do the work to get a doctoral degree in economics, and teaching at the University of Chicago, all while playing and then coaching football. Or just maybe, not everyone wants to be a football coach. Personally that profession has never interested me, but I am just one, admittedly, very flawed man. I don't know, but those are a few of the many possibilities.
Finally, even if you are so against all of this, you should at least read the part in the book about Coach Kelley from Arkansas. He claims that people come from all over, including college and NFL coaches, to absorb his system. They love it, but won't use it. The author's believe that is because that style of play would get them fired. I think, like the authors, that is because fans and managers wouldn't tolerate seeing the game change in a way that departs from conventional wisdom, even if that departure makes the team more successful in the long run. That is the oddest thing about all of this...the sheer resistance to something that could actually make the team we claim to love better, is shunned (like the forward pass 100 years ago) because no one believes it will work. It is about playing to win, vs. playing not to lose.
Even in the book The Blind Side, Lewis discusses this very thing. That is, the resistance to change in football. In it, he goes to great lengths to discuss Walsh's evolution of the passing attack that was utilized because it made moving the ball more efficient, backed up by numbers that are as compelling as these. And, his system at the 49ers was questioned, doubted, and mocked by many very loud opponents.
All I can tell you is that this book is fascinating, but you have to be open to challenging your perception.
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Burger
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Humans in general hate change. I deal with it all the time with my parents. I studied economics, and I absolutely love statistics. The only fatal flaw I see is these guys say, you should do something 100% because it works 70% of the time. There are times where there is no chance it will work. There are many variables in a situation that can determine a outcome.
The best example was that fake field goal vs. Vandy. There is a time where the 30% was worth taking. We should of kicked it then.
Have you ever seen the show deadliest warrior? They put together variables and run a 5000 time ran sample to determine a winner.
Interesting discussion. First, I am not sure that flaw is fatal. Being right 70% of the time, even if you are disastrously wrong the other 30% is not fatal, but I can certainly agree it is imperfect. The whole point made in the book is that even if you go for it and fail, you don't effect the likelihood that you will be scored on the next possession by a significant margin (I wish I could remember the exact numbers, but I want to say the change in being scored on was only 15% considering the change of field position by a typical punt). I don't think the fake field goal in the Vandy game is a good counter example either. I don't think the author's were advocating trick plays. Although trick plays would be a great additional issue to study.
I think that is what is confusing many here. Many are viewing the idea of "going for it" as imperfect and fatal (and it is imperfect) because they view failure as not getting the first down. In reality (according to the authors), going for it is significantly more likely than many believe and failing also doesn't significantly change the odds that you are scored on.
Imagine two scenarios and pretend they could exist simultaneously. Which would make fans feel worse, or which would you choose if you had to choose one?
A) UT vs. Bama: 4th and 2 with Tennessee on offense on our own 45. Tennessee goes for it, the conversion attempt fails and Bama takes up offense on our 45 yard line. Bama scores a touchdown 6 plays later.
B) UT vs. Bama: 4th and 2 with Tennessee on offense on our own 45. Tennessee punts, Bama returns the punt to their 45 and scores 6 plays later.
Is there any different in the outcome? Tennessee gave up 6 points in six plays. But, fans, and the media, would likely berate the coach for option A, while they would grumble and mumble at option B they wouldn't think punting was considered stupid or asinine or a sign of bad coaching.
And consider option A again. What if there is at least a 50% likelihood that you actually convert that play (I am certain the numbers were higher than that, but that is my hypothetical here)? Isn't a 50% likelihood that you keep the ball and increase your chances of scoring, better than a 60% likelihood that you get scored upon? Also consider the deflating effect of converting option A. Do that a few times and you begin to exhaust the defense even further increasing your odds. While the outcome was the same in that hypothetical situation, option B traded a substantial chance to keep the ball in exchange for a substantial chance to be scored upon. That is this theory in a nutshell.
We agree that all options are imperfect, and some are even fatally flawed. This book just hypothesizes that the fatally flawed ones might be the ones that the coaches are actually making now. It's just that no one notices because we don't know better.
It's like a story I heard once that illustrates this point beautifully. There was a young lady who opened a restaurant. One of her wildly popular dishes was her family's recipe for turkey. The recipe required that baste a turkey in certain secret spices, then you cut the bird in half, lay each half of the turkey in it's own 10" x 10" metal cooking pan, and bake for however long. One day the lady goes to visit her grandmother and tells her how everyone loves her grandmothers turkey. She tells her grandmother how she thinks the secret is in the way that you cook it. The grandmother asks what she means. The lady responds, well we take the time to carefully cut each turkey in half, just like mom said you used to and cook each half separately. The grandmother laughs and says, the only reason we cut the turkey in half was because back then we didn't own an oven big enough to cook a whole turkey in.
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Reverend Bubba Flavel
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It wasn't Wrigley's son that did it all, although he may have a role.
Up until the early 80s the White Sox and Cubs were fairly competitive in terms of attendance. In the 60s the Sox dominated, though. In the 70s it probably went back to the Cubs. Early 80s the Sox had the advantage. But a few things happened - the Sox had the too-much-ahead-of-its-time SportsVision disaster in early 80s and also threatened to move the club to tampa in the late 80s.
While the Tribune company bought the Cubs and Harray Caray left the Sox and went to the NorthSide.
So the Tribune comapny starts marketing the "Wrigley Field Experience", they are day games where you feel like you are playing hookey cutting work/school, Tribune carries a lot of Cubs games on television to a national audience on WGN, Harry Caray is an incredible salesman . . . You take all that and then add the sort of nostaligia for the old ballparks that began in the early 90s, the gentrification of Wrigleyville and the almost Disneyfication of the neighborhood and you get an event where winning does not matter at all.
But I do not think that is the reason the Cubs cannot win. They weren't winning championships those 60-70 years before attending a game was an event.
Anyway - attendance at Wrigley is starting to suffer some. Attendance has declined every year since 2009. And they have not topped the 3 million mark, which used to be a mainstay, since 2011. And attendance this year looks to be horrible - but it is only 3 games and it has been cold as hell in Chicago.
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Volosaurus rex
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I agree that Super Bowls can be won with either a great offense or a great defense, but I would submit that it can be done more easily with a great defense. Marino and the Dolphins are the classic example of a team with a great offense or, to be more precise, a great passing attack, who only made it to the proverbial big dance once because of their porous defense. Conversely, the 1985 Bears and 2000 Ravens epitomize the premise that "defenses win championship." On the other hand, teams with great offenses and great defenses are otherwise known as dynasties (e.g. the Packers during Lombardi's tenure, Steelers during the 1970s and 49ers during the 1980s). It has always been difficult to compile equally dominant assemblages of talents on both sides of the ball, but, arguably, it is even more so during the era of free agency.
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Burger
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Burger
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Burger
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I am very glad that you like it. If you like that, you'll love Scorecasting. If you have never read Michael Lewis's The Blind Side, it's discussion of the evolution of football is also a must read. It is an entertaining book as well, and the movie (as per usual) doesn't do it justice. Ironically, while his book Moneyball translated into a far superior movie, it was a far inferior book in my view.
Wait until you get to the chapter in Freakonomics about crime. That was the most compelling discussion about an incredibly contentious subject that I have ever read. I don't want to give too much away, but it is seriously thought provoking.
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MedicT
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These statistics are based on discrete plays. As soon as you run one play away from the expected game plan, the opponent will adjust for the next situation because they now expect the unexpected if you will. It seems to me this would invalidate the theory. I could be over thinking it or more likely under thinking it.
Burger
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Burger
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I actually don't believe in momentum, either (not at least in the way fans throw it around). The authors studied it. For instance they looked at having a "hot hand" in basketball and found that making x numbers of shots in a row does not increase the chances of making the next (based off of years of historical data).
They explain this simply by stating that most people completely misunderstand probability. The example they use is a stats teacher who tells his students to flip a coin hundreds of times and record the results. He says, "don't cheat and if you do I'll catch you." Every year some students cheat and he catches them. How?
Students believe in the law of averages, insofar as 100 flips of a coin should have roughly 50 heads and 50 tails, and there would be no long strings of either heads nor tails.
In reality, the students who cheat make up a string of figures that play to this very real misunderstanding and avoid long connections of heads or tails. It is very likely that there will be strings of heads (or tails), and that because each event is completely unaffected by the preceeding event, no matter how many times you hit heads before, the next flip is still 50% likely to be heads.
So, fans ultimately view shooting the basketball the same way they do coin tosses, insofar as they don't believe a long runs of heads is likely(when it is), they believe that making a bunch of shots in basketball is very unlikely which is the same way of saying that fans believe each shot is effected by the previous (when numbers show it isnt).
That's just one example, football kickers would be another, and so on.
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Burger
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MedicT
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tm3
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