The book that might end every discussion on Volnation.

[GAVol]

A key take away from this book was this: In 99% of the time that the numbers suggest you should kick the ball, the coaches kick the ball. Conversely, a coach "goes for it" only 40% of the times that they should.

Not surprising. That's one area of the game where coaches still play it as if it's 1975 and they're still running the veer.

 

[daj2576]

Not surprising. That's one area of the game where coaches still play it as if it's 1975 and they're still running the veer.

It is truly amazing how risk averse and archaic coaching really is.

 

[GAVol]

It is truly amazing how risk averse and archaic coaching really is.

That's what a 7 figure salary will do.

 

[daj2576]

That's what a 7 figure salary will do.

Good point. Keeping that salary requires satisfying fans who tend to not understand risk assessment either. It's a deadly spiral that just gets more expensive.

EDIT: Actually when I say "risk averse" that is misleading. Coaches aren't making the decision to maximize outcome, they are making the decision that maximizes their perception to the fans and their employers. If they did the former, they would truly be risk averse. By doing the latter, they are appearing risk averse to those who don't understand the actual risk in kicking the ball away.

 

[daj2576]

UPDATE:

Just finished reading 'The System' and have a few thoughts that you guys/gals might enjoy.



First, I wouldn't recommend the book in total. There are some excellent and informative parts, but it ends up being a sort of a 'behind the scenes' of Washington State, BYU, and in minor part Alabama.

Tennessee is mentioned several times throughout and in fact has a whole chapter devoted to the Orange Pride fiasco. I did feel a little dirty reading about that. Interesting to note that Tennessee message board conversations were referenced, including a consideration of suing some posters on a message board for defamation.

The other references to UT were benign at best, or similarly unflattering at worst. The authors made a point to illustrate that one of the NCAA's more questionable investigators had a degree from UT; that UT's recruiting practices (beyond Hostess-gate) were shady (including apparent promises that kids didn't need to ever worry about grades or perhaps even go to class); and, that UT had tried to hire Mike Leach before firing Fulmer (the reason that Leach declined to discuss the job thus bringing about the hiring of Kiff). A part of a chapter is devoted to the Lattimore injury during the SCAR/UT game.

I found this to be a well written and well researched discussion and there were some must-read chapters of the darker side of recruiting, player injuries, rapes/assaults by players, etc. Outside of those chapters, I didn't feel as passionate about the book as others recommended here. Simply put there were fewer 'ah-ha' moments. Maybe I am becoming a little too cynical about the football industry in general.

 

[Biopsyman]

Rather read Hustler

 

[tm3]

Thanks. I'll have to check out "Stumbling" and "System."

 

[Certifiedhands11]

This thread has truly been an incredibly interesting read, and it's probably safe to say it's the most intellectual/educated conversation I've seen on this board. Didn't know I was gonna need my TI-89 when I clicked on this thread. Never know what might happen here at crazy VN.

 

[daj2576]

This thread has truly been an incredibly interesting read, and it's probably safe to say it's the most intellectual/educated conversation I've seen on this board. Didn't know I was gonna need my TI-89 when I clicked on this thread. Never know what might happen here at crazy VN.

oh the memories of using a graphing calculator. Lol

 

[OrangeIsLife]

Don't know if anyone posted it but in 11 years Kevin Kelley's record at Pulaski Academy is 125-22.

 

[SpaceCoastVol]

Why does anyone ever run it out of the endzone in college anymore? You have to get 25 yards just to break even, and with the speed now on special teams, that isn't easily done.

 

[daj2576]

Why does anyone ever run it out of the endzone in college anymore? You have to get 25 yards just to break even, and with the speed now on special teams, that isn't easily done.

I've often thought the same thing. Give me 25 yards over a less than 1% chance to score 6. But that's just me.

 

[GAVol]

Why does anyone ever run it out of the endzone in college anymore? You have to get 25 yards just to break even, and with the speed now on special teams, that isn't easily done.

Don't ask me. I'd have the return man put his heels on the goal line and never even field one in the Endzone.

 

[VFL-82-JP]

Thanks for the heads up on these books; looking forward to reading them.

A few folks responded angrily in this thread. Resistance to change is part of it for some, sure. But the most common complaint seemed to be that decision-making based on statistical analysis takes all the fun out of the game. That the human factor (coach's gut, momentum, the "chess match" between opposing sidelines, and so on) would get washed out in a world guided by stats.

I don't think that's a danger, though. For a couple of key reasons:

(1) "Guided by" is hugely different than "blindly following." No human coach is ever going to let human nature be washed out of the mix. Oregon's coach is a great example. He's probably a proponent of (at least some of) the ideas in these books. The dude goes for it on 4th down more than anyone I've seen. And yet, he's still there, making judgment calls, deciding based on the particular circumstances at each point of the game.

(2) Smart coaches would know that none of these books were written specifically for their team. The stats change based on the subject. What is 70% chance of success across the board might be 73% or 76% for a particular team. As several in this thread have noted, there are outliers. So it's up to a team's coach to apply the insights of these statistical analyses to their particular team. Gotta be smart enough with prob & stats to do that well, but that's why we pay coaches the big bucks.

Speaking of momentum, I do firmly believe in it. Not in any statistical way (hitting 5 shots in a row doesn't increase the odds you'll make shot #6), but in a powerful, performance enhancing way. 18-24 year old men who are excited, who smell the blood of the kill, who sense a great thing happening and are eager to contribute to it, they play better. Conversely, frustrated, tired, miserable players who would prefer that the nightmare just hurry up and end, they don't play as well. Human spirit can shift odds and chances of success or failure significantly. Coaches know this, and can factor it in even while appreciating the value (and limitations) of statistical analysis.

Bottom line: there's room for this in Tennessee football without us losing any of the parts of our game that we love. Thanks again, daj2576, for suggesting the books!

 

[Boca Vol]

Why does anyone ever run it out of the endzone in college anymore? You have to get 25 yards just to break even, and with the speed now on special teams, that isn't easily done.

I completely agree. Also, I know UT had very good KO coverage this year but all it takes it 1 return to change a game. I hope UT can find a kicker that can kick it through the endzone when needed such as late in the 4th qtr with a 1 score lead.

 

[Boca Vol]

Thanks for the heads up on these books; looking forward to reading them.

A few folks responded angrily in this thread. Resistance to change is part of it for some, sure. But the most common complaint seemed to be that decision-making based on statistical analysis takes all the fun out of the game. That the human factor (coach's gut, momentum, the "chess match" between opposing sidelines, and so on) would get washed out in a world guided by stats.

I don't think that's a danger, though. For a couple of key reasons:

(1) "Guided by" is hugely different than "blindly following." No human coach is ever going to let human nature be washed out of the mix. Oregon's coach is a great example. He's probably a proponent of (at least some of) the ideas in these books. The dude goes for it on 4th down more than anyone I've seen. And yet, he's still there, making judgment calls, deciding based on the particular circumstances at each point of the game.

(2) Smart coaches would know that none of these books were written specifically for their team. The stats change based on the subject. What is 70% chance of success across the board might be 73% or 76% for a particular team. As several in this thread have noted, there are outliers. So it's up to a team's coach to apply the insights of these statistical analyses to their particular team. Gotta be smart enough with prob & stats to do that well, but that's why we pay coaches the big bucks.

Speaking of momentum, I do firmly believe in it. Not in any statistical way (hitting 5 shots in a row doesn't increase the odds you'll make shot #6), but in a powerful, performance enhancing way. 18-24 year old men who are excited, who smell the blood of the kill, who sense a great thing happening and are eager to contribute to it, they play better. Conversely, frustrated, tired, miserable players who would prefer that the nightmare just hurry up and end, they don't play as well. Human spirit can shift odds and chances of success or failure significantly. Coaches know this, and can factor it in even while appreciating the value (and limitations) of statistical analysis.

Bottom line: there's room for this in Tennessee football without us losing any of the parts of our game that we love. Thanks again, daj2576, for suggesting the books!

Great post! :good!:

Going back to the 4th down scenario, you also have to factor in the "comfort level" of the players. For a team like Oregon going for it on 4th down is no big deal because they're used to it. That expectation is built in from day 1.

Conversely, an equally talented but more conservative team may struggle in that situation because they aren't used to it.

I remember the 1st time I had to speak to a large group. No amount of rehearsing in front of a mirror can replace the reality of standing on a stage, alone, with a mic. Now, it's not that big of a deal.

You can also look at teams that just seem to win. FSU is a great example. How many times this past season were they down? But they pulled every one of them out...except for Oregon. But take Clemson or NC State. Did FSU go win the game, or did Clemson and NC State choke? I would say that FSU was comfortable in those scenarios whereas Clemson and NCSU weren't.

 

[tm3]

But the most common complaint seemed to be that decision-making based on statistical analysis takes all the fun out of the game.

Maybe, but the fun of winning would more than compensate!

 

[HoptownVol]

You bring up some very good points. There is a HS coach in Ark (Pulaski Academy) that never punts. He's done the math and statistically, he's correct. He also:

On-side kicks every chance he gets. One game his team was up 29-0 before their opponent ran an offensive play.

Rarely, if ever, allows his punt returners to return a punt. They fair-catch or let it go. Statistically, it isn't worth a fumble.

This coach said college coaches speak with him all the time and most say that they would be fired if they coached that way in college. On 4th down you're supposed to punt.

"The job of the offense is to get a few first downs then punt." Phillip Fulmer

 

[VFL-82-JP]

...you also have to factor in the "comfort level" of the players...no big deal because they're used to it.

Absolutely, success breeds success, we know we can do it because we've done it before.... Importance early on of practice, practice, practice, scrimmages, the O&W game, even early-season 'tune up' games against non-Power 5 opponents. Over multiple years, it becomes part of a team's character.

Maybe, but the fun of winning would more than compensate!

I agree entirely. Would certainly be a fan of seeing our coaches get a bit outside the "traditional" while attempting to take advantage of openings that these stat-based analyses suggest. Goes right to something said by an Oregon fanalyst ("Fishduck") in one of his videos. Paraphrasing, it was, "yeah this approach to our offense is why we have a lot more lost-yardage plays than other teams, but when it works, boy does it work!" His point was that, averaging out the good and the bad, his team's offense comes out ahead over the course of a football game or especially a season.

But those upon whom the Coach's job depends (AD, University leadership, boosters, fans, some more or less volatile mix of all the above) have to see past the single-play occasional failures to the broader results. Takes an insightful group of folks to see the method in the madness. Reading through most of the posts in this thread, I think we can do that!

 

[Wizard of Orange]

There's is definitely merit in this discussion and I am quite fond of the statistical side of sports.
However, I can't help but think that always going for it on fourth down is akin to always going all in on poker.
Statistically, a player with a lousy hand who bluffs by pushing all-in win more of those hands than the one who folds the lousy hand.( 0%)
However, I have never seen a tournament won by someone who did that. At some point, they get burned and lose it all.
The point is that the success rate of going for it on 4th has to be somewhat skewed due to the fact that opposing teams are 1) not expecting the deviation from the norm and 2) most teams pick their moments of "going for it" based to a degree on seeing some advantage that they can exploit at that point in time ( Talent or schematic).

 

[tm3]

I like the poker analogy, and that is how I have been thinking about all this. But, I would disagree on the comparison of going on 4th down to going all in.

I consider 4th down more like going up against AK with a medium pair. AK looks like a stronger hand, but the pair is the statistical favorite to win.

Plus poker, just like football, depends on position. Going for it on 4th from your own 1 won't have as many favorable outcomes as going for it on the opponent's 1.

 

[daj2576]

I like the poker analogy, and that is how I have been thinking about all this. But, I would disagree on the comparison of going on 4th down to going all in.

I consider 4th down more like going up against AK with a medium pair. AK looks like a stronger hand, but the pair is the statistical favorite to win.

Plus poker, just like football, depends on position. Going for it on 4th from your own 1 won't have as many favorable outcomes as going for it on the opponent's 1.

At first blush I liked the poker analogy but after some thought, I don't.

Going all in is a win or lose proposition. It is one play, game over either way (you win or lose). Going for it on fourth down, when that is the optimal decision, would happen so frequently that the one play would rarely be a deciding factor in the game. In other words, the risk assessment is actually opposite where going for it is relatively low risk, high reward and going all in is relatively high risk, high reward. At least that is if you believe the way the author's of these books describe true risk aversion as opposed to common knowledge risk aversion.

If memory serves, almost regardless of field position, the difference between going for it (and failing) and punting (and giving the ball to the other team) only increases your chance of being scored upon by 15%. That is, the net difference in the value of field position is such that it is better to keep the ball than to give it to your opponent. I'm not a poker player, but the probabilities seem to say that not going for it would be more akin to folding, even though you know what the other players are holding and you are all waiting on a draw card.

 

[Wizard of Orange]

Agreed, it depends a lot on position.
Which was really the point.

At present most coaches only go-for-it if they have some reason to believe their chances are better than normal. They are looking for tendencies and "tells' just like poker players.

And hope to take advantage of them in certain situations. Just always doing it, with no regard for " position" or situation is a formula for disaster.

Just for the record, I do believe that going for it on 4th down is under utilized. Just don't think that looking at success rate based on when it is attempted nowadays translates to success rate if you started doing it routinely.

 

[daj2576]

Agreed, it depends a lot on position.
Which was really the point.

At present most coaches only go-for-it if they have some reason to believe their chances are better than normal. They are looking for tendencies and "tells' just like poker players.

And hope to take advantage of them in certain situations. Just always doing it, with no regard for " position" or situation is a formula for disaster.

Just for the record, I do believe that going for it on 4th down is under utilized. Just don't think that looking at success rate based on when it is attempted nowadays translates to success rate if you started doing it routinely.

You make some good points. Your last sentence though is confusing. I can't think of a time when I would purposefully make a bad decision now for fear that at some point in the future that the better decision made presently might cease to be the best option.

That's like saying you won't change the oil in your car now because you know eventually you'll sell it, and it wouldn't make sense to change the oil in someone else's car.

At the point when going for it no longer works, you would use new data to adapt, not doggedly stick to antiquated theories (which is what we're doing now). That's my theory anyway.