I have probably watched the highlights from yesterday 10+ times. The offense is a machine, it's unstoppable when clicking. Napier's approach going for it every 4th down showed to me he knew that Florida was outmatched and couldn't stop Tennessee. We were the better team. No flukes or meltdowns from the other team. We were simply flat out better. He pulled out all the stops to try to stay in that game. This year just feels different, I expect us to win every week. I know we will drop 2 or 3 games probably but I dont see any team on the schedule and say for sure we have no chance like years past. I finally have faith in the program again. I havent felt this confident since the 90's. We haven't played our best football yet and are sitting 8th in the country with a 4-0 record. I know defense has struggled some but they have done just enough to get the W. With Huepel's offense thats all we need. To think how far we have come since Pruitt's last year, it's a small miracle from the football gods. Huepel has done a masterful job, even the most optimistic fans wouldn't have predicted this amount of success in year 2 when he was hired. It was a long rebuild. He is growing as a coach along with the players. This year his clock management is 100 times better. This team is disciplined, precise, methodical, and a blast to watch.
		
		
	 
No argument from me but FWIW some information about going for it on 4th down from a statistician (not a coach) based upon an NFL model. Lot of variables and caveats as you can see but interesting nonetheless.
From a NYT article  
4th Down: When to Go for It and Why
Sept. 4, 2014
Smarter Football
See how this article appeared when it was originally published on NYTimes.com.
This post is meant to be a quick tutorial on fourth-down strategy, neatly summarized in the chart above. (You can also read 
a post that explains the history of me — the NYT 4th Down Bot.)
First, the No. 1 lesson 
from my 10 years of data analysis about what to do on fourth down: 
Teams need to go for it much more often than they do. It does get a little complicated toward the end of games, but coaches should almost always consider going for it.
In a reasonably close game, and any time until the last 10 minutes of the fourth quarter — when time and score become even more important considerations — here are my recommendations.
In General
Coaches traditionally punt or kick on fourth downs, a convention inherited from the days when scores of 7-6 and 10-9 weren’t uncommon and a punt was more likely to pin an opponent on his side of the field. The modern N.F.L. is starkly different. It’s a pass-happy league in which offenses can zip up and down the field, easily gaining back the field position a punt may have purchased.
Touchdowns are obviously worth more than twice the points of a field goal. But a key and often overlooked consideration is that, despite the high accuracy of today’s kickers, field goals are not automatic. Coaches often behave as if they were.
Punts are no longer as valuable as they once were — the more freely offenses can move down the field, the less important field position becomes — and field goals aren’t as valuable as squishy human brains perceive, so that leaves the go-for-it option looking better every day.
More than half of all plays in the N.F.L. gain 4 or more yards, which means the numbers are on the offense’s side and a conversion is more likely than not. That’s why it frequently makes sense to go for it.
Near your own goal line, going for it on fourth-and-1 is better than punting: You’ll probably make the first down; if you don’t, your opponent will have good field position, but a punt would have given your opponent pretty good field position anyway. Near your opponent’s goal line, going for it is better because your opponent is left with poor field position even if you fail — and you’ll often get the ball back near midfield in short order.
As a rule of thumb:
On 
fourth-and-1, go for it any place on the field where that is possible, starting at your 9-yard line.
On 
fourth-and-2, go for it everywhere beyond your 28-yard line.
On 
fourth-and-3, go for it almost everywhere beyond your 40.
As the down-to-go distance increases, your chances of successfully converting a first down become smaller — and the decisions become more nuanced. On fourth-and-medium, punting is a good idea close to your end zone, and kicking a field goal is wise closer to your opponent’s. But around midfield, depending on the distance you have to go, I still recommend that coaches go for it.
Again, those rules of thumb, which vary depending on the specific teams involved:
On 
fourth-and-4, go for it between your 45 and your opponent’s 29.
On 
fourth-and-5, go for it between midfield and your opponent’s 33.
On 
fourth-and-6, go for it between your opponent’s 47 and your opponent’s 35.
As the yards-to-go increases, the low risk of succeeding on fourth down makes punting or kicking a field goal a wiser option for most places on the field, except in that nether region where you’re barely out of field-goal range but too close to punt. There, the risk of missing a field goal is too high, and the field position advantage you gain by punting is not as positive, especially if you punt in the end zone.
On 
fourth-and-7, go for it between your opponent’s 44 and your opponent’s 36.
On 
fourth-and-8, go for it between your opponent’s 41 and your opponent’s 37.
On 
fourth-and-9, the only place I recommend going for it is around your opponent’s 38.
On 
fourth-and-10 and worse, I don’t recommend rewarding your offense with another down.
Punting vs. Kicking
In general, if the numbers do not favor going for the first down, I recommend attempting a field goal rather than punting anywhere inside the opponent’s 37-yard line.
In the Final Minutes
My rules of thumb apply only before the time remaining becomes a critical consideration. If a game gets to that point, I use a more advanced method for weighing the options, but my recommendations are still based on the data.
Things to Remember
Finally, one strategy and one caveat that will help you sound smart or, at the very least, help you avoid embarrassment:
First, considering my aggressive recommendations on fourth-and-short, your third-down strategy should change as well. Given that I recommend going for it on fourth-and-1 in all cases — and that you’ll usually make it — designing a play to gain, say, 5 yards on third-and-6 can make more sense. 
Richard Thaler, the University of Chicago economist who’s a friend of mine (
really), offers this advice to coaches: “When you cross midfield, pretend your punter is hurt. It will improve the calls on both 3rd and 4th downs.”
Second, my model is for an average N.F.L. team: a baseline from which to deviate. Having a league-leading offense, a terrible punter or a Hall of Fame kicker means that a data-literate coach would adjust accordingly. 
My recommendations are the starting point — not the final word — for decision making.
Here’s an example: In Week 15 of the 2013 season, down by one with 43 seconds remaining in the game, the Baltimore Ravens had a fourth-and-8 on the Lions’ 43. A field goal — 61 yards, very long even in the N.F.L. — would have won the game, but my data told me it was very unlikely to succeed (a 15 percent chance, on average). I recommended going for it. But the Ravens didn’t have an average kicker. They had Justin Tucker, an excellent kicker, who made the field goal and won the game. My report 
disapproved, in part because it was 
based on kickers worse than Justin Tucker.
That game was an exception, though. My recommendations will apply to most teams in most circumstances. They’ll help you figure out when your team’s coach — or your most hated team’s coach — is hurting his team.
Get used to it. It will happen a whole lot over the next five months.