Death and Harm

Existence or non-existence of the person. That's the only harm I care about, in a morally relevant sense.

As someone who is dead can no longer experience sentiment or think abstractly, then one can conclude that the person does not exist. And something that does not exist, can obviously not be harmed. Is that really all you're trying to say? If so, not sure it was worth the read quite honestly. :hi:
 
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As someone who is dead can no longer experience sentiment or think abstractly, then one can conclude that the person does not exist. And something that does not exist, can obviously not be harmed. Is that really all you're trying to say? If so, not sure it was worth the read quite honestly. :hi:

That's exactly what I am saying.
 
The finger isn't harmed.

that's what I said.

there is no harm - the person now has one less finger but the five-fingered fellow was in the past. His existence is now as a four-fingered fellow and since there is no past or future it's as if he's always been four-fingered so no harm occurred.
 
that's what I said.

there is no harm - the person now has one less finger but the five-fingered fellow was in the past. His existence is now as a four-fingered fellow and since there is no past or future it's as if he's always been four-fingered so no harm occurred.

Try again.
 
In the finger case, your finger, in ceasing to exist, is not harmed. However, you, in continuing to exist, can say, as an existing person, "I am suffering deprivation": i.e., you can say, "I am experiencing harm".

In the case of death, you, as an existing entity, are no more. As such, you, as an existing entity, cannot say, "I am suffering deprivation". You cannot say, "I am experiencing harm", because you cannot say "I am", because there is no you, as such an entity is non-existent.

That is a significant distinction.
 
As someone who is dead can no longer experience sentiment or think abstractly, then one can conclude that the person does not exist. And something that does not exist, can obviously not be harmed. Is that really all you're trying to say? If so, not sure it was worth the read quite honestly. :hi:

That's exactly what I am saying.

In the finger case, your finger, in ceasing to exist, is not harmed. However, you, in continuing to exist, can say, as an existing person, "I am suffering deprivation": i.e., you can say, "I am experiencing harm".

In the case of death, you, as an existing entity, are no more. As such, you, as an existing entity, cannot say, "I am suffering deprivation". You cannot say, "I am experiencing harm", because you cannot say "I am", because there is no you, as such an entity is non-existent.

That is a significant distinction.

Again, your definition of harm requires the harmee to recognize harm to itself. The standard definition of harm does not hold such a requirement.
 
no thanks - I know where this goes.

You obviously don't know where it goes.

You are dead set on asserting either of the following:

Stones can be harmed.

Non-existent things can be harmed.

One can be harmed by a change prior to the occurrence of said change.

The latter two are just absurd on their face. The former is absurd if you then want to make the claim that the infliction of harm is morally relevant (as opposed to merely the infliction of harm can be morally relevant).

Since almost every human activity can be morally relevant, the infliction of harm now loses any extra force in any moral discourse.
 
Again, your definition of harm requires the harmee to recognize harm to itself. The standard definition of harm does not hold such a requirement.

It does not require this, as I have stated. It requires the possibility to recognize, as I have stated.

As for "the standard definition", who cares? Dictionary definitions are often subjected to extreme scrutiny and criticism by those who actually understand and analyse language and concepts.

Basically, if you are relying on some "standard definition" of harm such that it allows for non-existent things to be harmed, then you should reject said "standard definition".
 
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Yes, but the process of dying isn't usually instantaneous. The act that initiates the dying is therefore a harm that exists until the dying is complete.

Correct, and I can be harmed by being stabbed. But, the actually death is not some extra harm to me.
 
You obviously don't know where it goes.

You are dead set on asserting either of the following:

Stones can be harmed.

Non-existent things can be harmed.

One can be harmed by a change prior to the occurrence of said change.

The latter two are just absurd on their face. The former is absurd if you then want to make the claim that the infliction of harm is morally relevant (as opposed to merely the infliction of harm can be morally relevant).

Since almost every human activity can be morally relevant, the infliction of harm now loses any extra force in any moral discourse.

1. Yes - the definition of harm suggests even stones can be harmed.

2. I'm not suggesting this at all.

3. Not exactly - the harm is the action causing the state change. The object of harm need not be aware of the state change for harm to have occurred.

4. There is sufficient pondering of acceptable harm to deem it a morally relevant topic. It may not rise to your high standards. Further it's designation as morally relevant, mostly morally relevant, sometimes morally relevant or not even worth discussing is tangental at best to your core argument.

It's clear your argument depends on a certain concept of harm even though you argued any definition (including the generally used one) supports your argument.
 
Splitting that hair pretty thin, aren't you?

Nuance is the friend of truth.

I've encountered both on here and in conversations with others the following belief: when one is killed, that they are killed, in itself, is a harm to them. A lot of individuals who make this argument are Consequentialists who focus on reduces harm as their guiding moral principle. When I ask where the harm of simply killing persons lies, even if it is done suddenly, painlessly, etc., they assert that the harm is in the death itself.

This position puzzles me, because I can't locate where said harm exists. Further, most of these Consequentialists reject any notion of a continuing soul. I find the position to be absolutely incoherent.
 
Correct, and I can be harmed by being stabbed. But, the actually death is not some extra harm to me.

so in your world there is no difference in being stabbed and living, and being stabbed and dying? assuming same knife, same wound track, same force, area etc etc.
 
It does not require this, as I have stated. It requires the possibility to recognize, as I have stated.

As for "the standard definition", who cares? Dictionary definitions are often subjected to extreme scrutiny and criticism by those who actually understand and analyse language and concepts.

Basically, if you are relying on some "standard definition" of harm such that it allows for non-existent things to be harmed, then you should reject said "standard definition".

On the above - I have not stated that nonexistent objects can be harmed though you keep saying so.

In general:

When I said I know where this goes...

Were back to how these things always go - you have a set of rules, assumptions (often stated as must be trues) that underlie your initial statement. When people counter your theory but violate your rules (often unstated until said violation occurs) you argue they are violating your rules and assumptions.

I knew better than to jump in but I did.
 
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On the above - I have not stated that nonexistent objects can be harmed though you keep saying so.

In general:

When I said I know where this goes...

Were back to how these things always go - you have a set of rules, assumptions (often stated as must be trues) that underlie your initial statement. When people counter your theory but violate your rules (often unstated until said violation occurs) you argue they are violating your rules and assumptions.

I knew better than to jump in but I did.

I kinda see it as the Seven Degrees of Trut, how quickly can you make him jump the connection?
 
1. Yes - the definition of harm suggests even stones can be harmed.

That's asinine.

2. I'm not suggesting this at all.

You are committed to it, though.

3. Not exactly - the harm is the action causing the state change. The object subject[/s] of harm need not be aware of the state change for harm to have occurred.


The subject of harm needs to exist as a subject of harm.

4. There is sufficient pondering of acceptable harm to deem it a morally relevant topic. It may not rise to your high standards. Further it's designation as morally relevant, mostly morally relevant, sometimes morally relevant or not even worth discussing is tangental at best to your core argument.

Harm, as you define it, provides no reason, in itself, to even consider whether something morally inappropriate has occurred. If I strike a stone, there is not even the hint nor the presumption that anything morally relevant has occurred.

It's clear your argument depends on a certain concept of harm even though you argued any definition (including the generally used one) supports your argument.

My argument depends merely on the belief that the subject of harm must exist as the subject of harm.
 
Jumping in here late. Are we assuming--must we assume--that "harms" are like pains felt by particular subjects at particular times?
 
On the above - I have not stated that nonexistent objects can be harmed though you keep saying so.

In general:

When I said I know where this goes...

Were back to how these things always go - you have a set of rules, assumptions (often stated as must be trues) that underlie your initial statement. When people counter your theory but violate your rules (often unstated until said violation occurs) you argue they are violating your rules and assumptions.

I knew better than to jump in but I did.

I do have rules, and they are pretty basic here.
 
Nuance is the friend of truth.

I've encountered both on here and in conversations with others the following belief: when one is killed, that they are killed, in itself, is a harm to them. A lot of individuals who make this argument are Consequentialists who focus on reduces harm as their guiding moral principle. When I ask where the harm of simply killing persons lies, even if it is done suddenly, painlessly, etc., they assert that the harm is in the death itself.

This position puzzles me, because I can't locate where said harm exists. Further, most of these Consequentialists reject any notion of a continuing soul. I find the position to be absolutely incoherent.

Of course, there's then harm to those outside the individual to consider. Friends, family, society in general. That's a jump from what you're arguing, however.
 
Of course, there's then harm to those outside the individual to consider. Friends, family, society in general. That's a jump from what you're arguing, however.

Correct, I think that plenty of other persons would be harmed by my being killed.

But, for these Consequentialists, you can simply make it the case that we could kill drifters or simply eradicate whole societies. Basically, in focusing on reducing harm, once we establish that there is no harm in death, per se, we can derive the following conclusion from their theory:

It is worse to kill one person than to eradicate an entire society.

Cards on the table: I abhor Consequentialism.
 
That's asinine.
Harm, as you define it, provides no reason, in itself, to even consider whether something morally inappropriate has occurred. If I strike a stone, there is not even the hint nor the presumption that anything morally relevant has occurred.

Just curious, but if you harm someone's reputation would you consider that to be morally relevant?
 

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