"Analytics"

[AboveAllNations]

CBJ said that analytics went into the decision to kick the field goal from the 8 inch line. 4 or 5 hours of planning.
He says that the coaching staff leaves nothing to chance.

I believe CBJ is a good coach and is on the right track, but do any of you agree that relying too much on such logical analysis handicaps you in game situations.

Mr. Spock made an excellent science officer but...

This is backwards: Butch Jones made the decision to kick the field goal against what an analytical analysis would suggest.

In this particular instance, the analysis is easy. Even assuming generously that the odds of a 19-yard field goal are 100% and the odds of converting fourth and goal from a foot out are 50% (realistically it should be closer to 80%), the odds say that the reward of a touchdown is worth the risk:

Average outcome = value of positive outcome x probability of positive outcome

Average outcome of kicking = 3 pts x 100% = 3 pts

Average outcome of going for it = 7 pts x 50% = 3.5 pts

Even if a team fails to score a touchdown, it pins the opponent inside their own 1-yard line, which dramatically increases the odds of a subsequent safety (tackle for loss, sack, holding penalty, intentional grounding), blocked punt, or favorable field position on the next possession. And that's the WORST case scenario.

Commentators and statisticians have written extensively about how football coaches are too risk averse, including Nate Silver and Greg Easterbrook. Last year's NFC Championship game, where Green Bay lost after repeatedly deciding to kick field goals in the redzone, is a prime example.

Here, Butch clearly IGNORED analytics and went with what his gut was telling him. His answer after the game that he wanted to build "momentum" at the time shows that he's essentially an irrational, superstitious decision-maker.

Anybody who wants to blame analytics for this bad decision doesn't understand analytics any better than Jones.

 

[dcm3w]

People that are saying "why wouldn't he just power it in with Hurd" are the same people that would have said "why didnt he kick the damn FG!?"

 

[crusse10]

But why was Ellis in that play and not Wolf?

If Wolf was in, there would have been better coverage.

 

[dcm3w]

This is backwards: Butch Jones made the decision to kick the field goal against what an analytical analysis would suggest.

In this particular instance, the analysis is easy. Even assuming generously that the odds of a 19-yard field goal are 100% and the odds of converting fourth and goal from a foot out are 50% (realistically it should be closer to 80%), the odds say that the reward of a touchdown is worth the risk:

Average outcome = value of positive outcome x probability of positive outcome

Average outcome of kicking = 3 pts x 100% = 3 pts

Average outcome of going for it = 7 pts x 50% = 3.5 pts

Even if a team fails to score a touchdown, it pins the opponent inside their own 1-yard line, which dramatically increases the odds of a subsequent safety (tackle for loss, sack, holding penalty, intentional grounding), blocked punt, or favorable field position on the next possession. And that's the WORST case scenario.

Commentators and statisticians have written extensively about how football coaches are too risk averse, including Nate Silver and Greg Easterbrook. Last year's NFC Championship game, where Green Bay lost after repeatedly deciding to kick field goals in the redzone, is a prime example.

Here, Butch clearly IGNORED analytics and went with what his gut was telling him. His answer after the game that he wanted to build "momentum" at the time shows that he's essentially an irrational, superstitious decision-maker.

Anybody who wants to blame analytics for this bad decision doesn't understand analytics any better than Jones.

That's not why GB lost bro beans. Pretty sure that kick return did them in.

 

[GameTime]

It's disturbing that Butch doesn't think two power dive plays by Hurd would have scored from the 2 foot line...Very Alpha thinking by Butch.

Stoops must have been smiling at out lack of commitment to score a touchdown from the 2 foot line.

 

[ntxVOL]

Honestly, I don't want a coach who makes in game decisions based on statistics and probability. Probability cannot predict the next roll of the dice, it can only predict cumulative results over the long term.

 

[Rifleman]

Honestly, I don't want a coach who makes in game decisions based on statistics and probability. Probability cannot predict the next roll of the dice, it can only predict cumulative results over the long term.

I think the problem with Butch's statement is that his on-the-field decision is obviously inconsistent with statistical models.

College teams have converted 4th downs under 1 yard at a rate of greater than 70% over the past few seasons, so if he is making his decisions based on data, then his data is wrong and he will continue to make bad decisions.

 

[jenkins76]

Don't know if anyone remembers, but Dooley actually cited these stats and percentages as reasons for his stupid in-game decisions.

 

[Stevorino]

2 things:

- 'Analytics' is the sexy word for saying they studied the ramifications of the decision. It comes down to more than 'does Butch have the balls to go for it'. He understands far better than anyone on this board what his odds were to convert it based on practice repetitions, the impact it has on momentum and morale, and the down-the-line possibilities it opens up/closes based on 3 vs 7 points.

- I don't know why we would be sitting here second guessing a 1st quarter field goal. There are a dozen other things that are far more worth questioning - like why can Dobbs not complete a pass beyond 10 yards? Or why does Jumper get pass interference calls on key plays? Or why do we have false starts that stunt offensive drives?

 

[FeelsLike98]

2 things:

- 'Analytics' is the sexy word for saying they studied the ramifications of the decision. It comes down to more than 'does Butch have the balls to go for it'. He understands far better than anyone on this board what his odds were to convert it based on practice repetitions, the impact it has on momentum and morale, and the down-the-line possibilities it opens up/closes based on 3 vs 7 points.

- I don't know why we would be sitting here second guessing a 1st quarter field goal. There are a dozen other things that are far more worth questioning - like why can Dobbs not complete a pass beyond 10 yards? Or why does Jumper get pass interference calls on key plays? Or why do we have false starts that stunt offensive drives?

I think it's more about the mindset. Too conservative. Playing not to lose instead of playing to win. The same mindset that makes one sit on a 17 point lead. The same mindset that got us beat. And why do we have false starts that stunt drives? New to Tennessee football??? lol that's been happening since I've been alive, even in the late 90s this was a thing.

 

[AboveAllNations]

2 things:

- 'Analytics' is the sexy word for saying they studied the ramifications of the decision. It comes down to more than 'does Butch have the balls to go for it'. He understands far better than anyone on this board what his odds were to convert it based on practice repetitions, the impact it has on momentum and morale, and the down-the-line possibilities it opens up/closes based on 3 vs 7 points.

According to an analytical analysis, kicking a field goal only makes sense if the odds of scoring a touchdown were less than 43% (i.e., where the average outcome of going for it = 3 pts or less = 7pts x .43). And that doesn't account for the "down the line possibilities" opened up by a turnover on downs inside the opponents 1 yard line.

You think that a team that just rushed for 399 yards the week before can't convert this 4th and inches more than 43% of the time?

- I don't know why we would be sitting here second guessing a 1st quarter field goal. There are a dozen other things that are far more worth questioning - like why can Dobbs not complete a pass beyond 10 yards? Or why does Jumper get pass interference calls on key plays? Or why do we have false starts that stunt offensive drives?

Penalties and failures in execution are inevitable and excusable, to a certain extent. Irrational and cowardly coaching decisions, however early in the game they may be made, deserve more scrutiny. Especially when the purported reason for the decision (here, "analytics") is patently absurd and easily disproven.

 

[Vol Main]

This is backwards: Butch Jones made the decision to kick the field goal against what an analytical analysis would suggest.

In this particular instance, the analysis is easy. Even assuming generously that the odds of a 19-yard field goal are 100% and the odds of converting fourth and goal from a foot out are 50% (realistically it should be closer to 80%), the odds say that the reward of a touchdown is worth the risk:

Average outcome = value of positive outcome x probability of positive outcome

Average outcome of kicking = 3 pts x 100% = 3 pts

Average outcome of going for it = 7 pts x 50% = 3.5 pts

Even if a team fails to score a touchdown, it pins the opponent inside their own 1-yard line, which dramatically increases the odds of a subsequent safety (tackle for loss, sack, holding penalty, intentional grounding), blocked punt, or favorable field position on the next possession. And that's the WORST case scenario.

Commentators and statisticians have written extensively about how football coaches are too risk averse, including Nate Silver and Greg Easterbrook. Last year's NFC Championship game, where Green Bay lost after repeatedly deciding to kick field goals in the redzone, is a prime example.

Here, Butch clearly IGNORED analytics and went with what his gut was telling him. His answer after the game that he wanted to build "momentum" at the time shows that he's essentially an irrational, superstitious decision-maker.

Anybody who wants to blame analytics for this bad decision doesn't understand analytics any better than Jones.

You neglected the meaning of the numbers. 100% odds of getting 3 points keeps momentum. 50% odds of getting 6 points means flipping the coin to win or lose momentum. The 3 points Jones did get sent the game to overtime, even after all of the other failed opportunities.

 

[WesternKyVol]

4th Down Calculator

 

[KBVol]

Or UT fumbles and the Sooners return it for a TD. There were more important plays later in the game that was not made I was upset about. I am still pulling for the players and coaches to learn and improve from this game and win 8 or more this year.

Speaking of analytics, I doubt the likelihood of that happening even made it to Butch's "book of equations". On the other hand, I think I read where the success rate of making it on 4th and 1 yard or less is about 75%...I'm thinking that's the stat that he should've been looking at.

 

[AboveAllNations]

You neglected the meaning of the numbers. 100% odds of getting 3 points keeps momentum. 50% odds of getting 6 points means flipping the coin to win or lose momentum. The 3 points Jones did get sent the game to overtime, even after all of the other failed opportunities.

You weren't the slightest bit disappointed when you saw our field goal unit jogging onto the field for fourth and goal from the 1? You don't think the players were disappointed? You don't think the offense was pissed that the coaching staff doesn't trust them to pick up one yard? You don't think the defense would've relished an opportunity to pin its ears back with a maximum advantage in field position?

If anything, kicking that field goal deflated our momentum. Any way you slice it, rational or otherwise, that was a terrible decision.

 

[tenninohio]

O

This is backwards: Butch Jones made the decision to kick the field goal against what an analytical analysis would suggest.

In this particular instance, the analysis is easy. Even assuming generously that the odds of a 19-yard field goal are 100% and the odds of converting fourth and goal from a foot out are 50% (realistically it should be closer to 80%), the odds say that the reward of a touchdown is worth the risk:

Average outcome = value of positive outcome x probability of positive outcome

Average outcome of kicking = 3 pts x 100% = 3 pts

Average outcome of going for it = 7 pts x 50% = 3.5 pts

Even if a team fails to score a touchdown, it pins the opponent inside their own 1-yard line, which dramatically increases the odds of a subsequent safety (tackle for loss, sack, holding penalty, intentional grounding), blocked punt, or favorable field position on the next possession. And that's the WORST case scenario.

Commentators and statisticians have written extensively about how football coaches are too risk averse, including Nate Silver and Greg Easterbrook. Last year's NFC Championship game, where Green Bay lost after repeatedly deciding to kick field goals in the redzone, is a prime example.

Here, Butch clearly IGNORED analytics and went with what his gut was telling him. His answer after the game that he wanted to build "momentum" at the time shows that he's essentially an irrational, superstitious decision-maker.

Anybody who wants to blame analytics for this bad decision doesn't understand analytics any better than Jones.

BCS statistics show that a team should score from one yard line about 60% of time. With high powered offenses these days and the make/break of just one more play, football is no longer a game of field position; it is a game of possessions.

Poor clock management in third quarter gave OK more time in 4th qtr. It sounds great to brag about the speed of the offense, but with a 17 point lead, maybe use some clock, regardless of play called???

I am hoping CBJ improves his technique/skill level at the SEC tier of top teams. He/we are not there yet.

 

[GAVol]

Hearing this is what bothered me the most about the coaching Saturday. It's always easy to blame the coaches, but even though their play calling lacked aggression, this was the perfect storm of things going wrong: Alex Ellis dropped sure TD pass, offensive penalties, Hurd's fumble, Pearson falling down on a counter with room to run, phantom defensive holding penalties, etc. etc.

However, not going for it on 4th down and using the reasoning against as analytics is BS. I'm all for using probabilities 90% of the time, but big time coaches in big games, have to take chances on the fly. Sometimes you just have to say **ck it, we're going to kick your butt and run you right over with our best. We have the players to do this now. Butch needs to take notice and do it.

Stoops did it in the end with Shepard - and it worked. Same thing with the WR's. Use your best- establish a go to guy and throw him the dang ball. The analytics crap is BS if you want to win championships.

In other words, you're in favor of analytics unless they don't work.

 

[GAVol]

Poor clock management in third quarter gave OK more time in 4th qtr.

You're going to have to explain that one to me.

 

[photovol]

Are some Vol faithful starting to get tired of listening to Jones analytics, or do most fans, just not understand?

 

[Purplehaze26]

Look at it this way:
They go for it don't get it and OU goes down the field and scores. Everyone would be saying that was a stupid play call and should have just kicked the FG. Its a lose-lose situation.

That is totally irrelevant, mainly because they would have to have gone 99 1/2 yards on offense. Our defense was totally fresh and dominated for 3 qtrs so this scenario only had about 1/2 % chance of happening!! Our running game was churning so the only logical choice was to use your 240 lb. Heisman candidate to hit them while they were reeling!

 

[TrueOrange]

the team was an Alex Ellis catch away from winning. Enough correct calls were made to win. Not enough plays were executed well enough to win.

Or a field goal.

Or a not-out-of-range-knocking fumble on first down fumble right at the door of OU's red zone.

Or had any of our 5 or 6 players been able to hold on to their QB on any of those late 3rd and longs.

 

[GameTime]

Some of us are as upset with the call of not going for it with Hurd twice, as we are with Butch for insulting us with that BS....

Just run Hurd and shot the hell up Jones.

 

[VolinMC]

Speaking of analytics, I doubt the likelihood of that happening even made it to Butch's "book of equations". On the other hand, I think I read where the success rate of making it on 4th and 1 yard or less is about 75%...I'm thinking that's the stat that he should've been looking at.

Not saying Butch thought they might fumble. Just responding to another poster about a possible bad play might happen. In 36 year of watching the Big Orange, I don't count out anything happening.

By the way KB, I enjoy reading your "conversations" on here with SJT. Those are classics. Keep it up.

 

[Shake N Bake]

Since he is talking about "Analytics", maybe he can explain why on 3rd down our 240 beast of a RB was on the sideline and he tried to use the smaller RB to punch it in? It's the small simple decisions In a game that sometimes can be the most important, especially when it's making sure the best personnel for that situation is on the field.

 

[vol-un-tear]

If we don't score by chance they have the ball on the 1. Defense was playing lights out. I take my chances!!!! Score on offense or Defense!