No, not all moral judgments are value judgments; in fact, I am disposed to think that no moral judgments are value judgments. Moral judgments could only be value judgments to a consequentialist (and, even then, many consequentialist would argue that they are not making value judgments). I take a deontic approach to morality.
Nagel is a clown. Of course, he offers one of the most outlandish arguments for altruism that I have ever read. For some reason, he felt the need to justify his beliefs against the possibility of an attack based on athletic competition. Nagel admits that athletic competition is not immoral, in fact, it is morally praiseworthy. Then he states that the altruistic reason a boxer ought to try as hard as he can to beat his opponent is because the utility gained by his opponent when his opponent wins is so much greater since the first boxer was trying so hard.
If this reason is given as a reason, though, then it cannot be confined to the boxing ring. One could easily be just as altruistic as the boxer and be the most oppressive dictator the world has ever known, because the utility gained when the oppressed overthrow said dictator would be so great (remember, revenge is by far the sweetest and greatest pleasure, according to Homer).
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