There are research and medical purposes I believe.
29 April 2021
Robert E. Kelley
On 13 April,
Iran announced its intention to enrich uranium to 60 per cent U-235. This was
characterized by Iran as a response to a
sabotage of its vast underground enrichment cascades at Natanz two days before. The move comes against the backdrop of sensitive negotiations happening in Vienna aimed at rescuing the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and bringing the United States back into compliance with the deal.
Iran had already been producing uranium enriched to just under 20 per cent (around 19.5 per cent) following a decision in December 2020, a deliberate step away from compliance with the JCPOA’s terms. Enrichment to 60 per cent, however, is a significant escalation in enrichment operations.
Once it has been enriched beyond 20 per cent, uranium enters a different nuclear materials safeguards accounting category: highly enriched uranium (HEU). Although under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it is legal for any country to produce HEU, the JCPOA limits Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent.
Iran’s decision has also inevitably drawn international attention because it brings the country so close to producing 90 per cent-enriched uranium, which is generally considered weapons-grade.
A political message
Uranium enriched to 60 per cent cannot be used to make a useful nuclear explosive device, and Iran has no other realistic use for this material.
Nevertheless, 60 per cent was not an arbitrary choice. Cascades of centrifuges are designed to enrich uranium in steps; Iran’s centrifuges are likely set up to enrich up to 20 per cent, from 20 to 60 per cent, and from 60 to 90 per cent. Assuming the 60 per cent-enriched uranium is stored in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas—and there would be no point in Iran converting it to any other chemical form—the enrichment step from 60 per cent-enriched to weapons-grade uranium
is very short.
This strongly suggests that Iran’s decision was intended to send a political message: ‘We have gone as far as we can go in response to provocations without producing weapons-grade uranium.’