Glitch
You called down the thunder well now you've got it
- Joined
- Feb 3, 2013
- Messages
- 45,360
- Likes
- 223,405
Looks like the primary point in question for the SCOTUS was: "Should we consider the NCAA as a special institution, immune to anti-trust law?" The court most certainly weighed in on that, as mentioned in earlier posts:
In essence, it seeks immunity from the normal operation of the antitrust laws and argues, in any event, that the district court should have approved all of its existing restraints. We took this case to consider those objections.
At the center of this thicket of associations and rules sitsa massive business. The NCAA’s current broadcast contract for the March Madness basketball tournament isworth $1.1 billion annually. See id., at 1077, n. 20. Its television deal for the FBS conference’s College FootballPlayoff is worth approximately $470 million per year. Seeid., at 1063; Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2012. Beyond these sums, the Division I conferences earn substantial revenue from regular-season games. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) “made more than $409 million inr evenues from television contracts alone in 2017, with its total conference revenues exceeding $650 million that year.” D. Ct. Op., at 1063. All these amounts have “increased consistently over the years.” Ibid.Those who run this enterprise profit in a different way than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee.The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million per 8 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTONOpinion of the Courtyear. Brief for Players Association of the National FootballLeague et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Commissioners of the top conferences take home between $2 to $5 million. Ibid. College athletic directors average more than $1 million annually. Ibid. And annual salaries for top Division I college football coaches approach $11 million, with some of theirassistants making more than $2.5 million. Id., at 17–18.
Interesting pun. Reading the SCOTUS opinion on NIL, in giving the history of college athletics. The first college athletic match ion history was a boat race.And we boat races them in embarrassing fashion.
From the start, American colleges and universities havehad a complicated relationship with sports and money. In1852, students from Harvard and Yale participated in whatmany regard as the Nation’s first intercollegiate competition—a boat race at Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire.But this was no pickup match. A railroad executive sponsored the event to promote train travel to the picturesquelake. T. Mendenhall, The Harvard-Yale Boat Race 1852–1924, pp. 15–16 (1993). He offered the competitors an allexpenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes—along with unlimited alcohol. See A. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals 6–7 (1999) (Zimbalist); Rushin, Inside the Moat, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 3, 1997. The event filled the resort with “lifeand excitement,” N. Y. Herald, Aug. 10, 1852, p. 2, col. 2,and one student-athlete described the “‘junket’” as an experience “‘as unique and irreproducible as the Rhodian colossus,’” Mendenhall, Harvard-Yale Boat Race, at 20.
Not faith. I doubt the SEC office is on the up and up across the board. Would say that about every university too. Any million/billion dollar organization is a good opp for corruption.Your faith in both those organizations is quite impressive.![]()
You wish.Lol. You need to get off the internet.![]()
In applying the rule of reason, the district court began by observing that the NCAA enjoys “near complete dominance of, and exercise monopsony power in, the relevant market”—which it defined as the market for “athletic services in men’s and women’s Division I basketball and FBS football, wherein each class member participates in his or her sport-specific market.” D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The “most talented athletes are concentrated” in the “markets for Division I basketball and FBS football.” Id., at 1067. There areno “viable substitutes,” as the “NCAA’s Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football andbasketball.” Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its member schools have the “power to restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.” Id., at 1070.
The district court then proceeded to find that the NCAA’scompensation limits “produce significant anticompetitive 10 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTONOpinion of the Courteffects in the relevant market.” Id., at 1067. Though member schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes,the NCAA uses its monopsony power to “cap artificially thecompensation offered to recruits.” Id., at 1097. In a market without the challenged restraints, the district court found,“competition among schools would increase in terms of the compensation they would offer to recruits, and student athlete compensation would be higher as a result.” Id., at1068. “Student-athletes would receive offers that would more closely match the value of their athletic services.”Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA “did not meaningfully dispute” any of this evidence. Id., at 1067; seealso Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“[T]here’s no dispute that the—theno-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a relevant antitrust market”).
Nor did the district court find much evidence to support the NCAA’s contention that its compensation restrictions play a role in consumer demand. As the court put it, the evidence failed “to establish that the challenged compensation rules, in and of themselves, have any direct connection to consumer demand.”
Exactly the market does eventually stabilize. Bottom line the NCAA doesn’t like something they can’t control or regulate. They are only interested in power and control of their choosing.I dunno why all the huff and puff by the NCAA about NIL, the NIL era started super strong with kids getting offered Millions. Then the companies/collectives involved realized this wasn’t sustainable and the NIL market essentially fixed itself, where kids aren’t getting anywhere close to a million “unless they are extremely coveted”, yet the NCAA is freaking out because of how badly they have tried to handle the situation.
The district courtemphasized that the NCAA must have “ample latitude” torun its enterprise and that courts “may not use antitrustlaws to make marginal adjustments to broadly reasonablemarket restraints.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these standards, the court found thestudent-athletes had met their burden in some respects butnot others. The court rejected the student-athletes’ challenge to NCAA rules that limit athletic scholarships to thefull cost of attendance and that restrict compensation andbenefits unrelated to education. These may be price-fixingagreements, but the court found them to be reasonable inlight of the possibility that “professional-level cash payments . . . could blur the distinction between college sportsand professional sports and thereby negatively affect consumer demand.” Ibid.
Unsatisfied with this result, the NCAA asks us to reverseto the extent the lower courts sided with the studentathletes. For their part, the student-athletes do not renewtheir across-the-board challenge to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions. Accordingly, we do not pass on the rulesthat remain in place or the district court’s judgment upholding them. Our review is confined to those restrictions nowenjoined.