Really nice article...
Tomorrow the Crimean Bridge maybe just maybe gets blown.
How to Take Crimea: The (Coming?) Siege of Crimea
So given all this, how should Ukraine proceed?
Well, first and foremost, they should find a way to take out the pride of recent Russian infrastructure achievements, the Crimean Bridge. This would make it far more difficult to supply Crimea and Russian forces that have invaded further into Ukraine from Crimea; with the anti-ship missile threat looming for the Russia Navy, that leaves the treacherous land corridor from the Donetsk,
subject to Ukrainian
partisan attacks and Ukrainian military raids, counterattacks, and air, drone, and missile strikes. The destruction of the bridge will also further weaken Russia’s low morale, not just its pathetic logistical efforts.
Then, it could be possible for Ukraine, now getting reinforced by heavy weapons and troops that were victorious to the north, to launch an attack to break through the Kherson front and advance to the Crimean border, cutting it off from other Russian forces. Yet, as Russia seems keen on an offensive in the area, it would be wise to first allow Russian forces to smash themselves into pieces as they have with their offensives elsewhere. Unlike, say, the situation in Mariupol, where a small number of Ukrainian defenders have held on
heroically despite the odds and inflicted outsized casualties on Russian forces, the Russians will find far more, better-rested, better-equipped, and better-supplied Ukrainian troops near Kherson. If the Russians are stupid enough to attack and repeat their failures near Kyiv and elsewhere in the north, the Ukrainians can play defense and inflict heavy casualties before launching their own counterattack.
But if Russia is slow to attack or is bluffing around Kherson to focus more on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the Donbas, Ukraine may be able to catch Russia off-guard and still launch an offensive from around Kherson that could cut off Crimea from Russian positions to its north and roll back many of the gains Russia has made in south-central Ukraine. Such a move might prompt Russia to weaken its support for the Donbas offensives to meet the Ukrainian offensive.
Whether it waits for the Russians to mash its battalion tactical groups (BTGs) against better equipped Ukrainian troops or takes the initiative and launches an assault first, Ukraine will be able to seriously threaten Crimea sooner rather than later if it can knock out that Crimean Bridge and destroy or drive off the Russian Navy with anti-ship missiles; indeed, both of these are well-within Ukraine’s capabilities.
With most forces that were in Crimea taking part in the invasion to Crimea’s north, again, we can expect a not terribly strong troop presence in Crimea. Adding support to the idea that Crimea is not the best-supplied area at the moment is that the Russians
are looting grain from granaries in Kherson and elsewhere and moving the plundered grain into Crimea,
along with vegetables.
Thus, it would be relatively easy to put Crimea under a form of siege. With its one bridge to Russia destroyed and Russian naval vessels either sunk from anti-ship missile or fleeing out of their range and into irrelevance, land and sea routes to resupply and reinforce Crimea will be cut off, and, as noted, it is unlikely large numbers of quality troops will have been left behind in Crimea. Air drops would be possible but aircraft will also be at risk from stinger missiles and Ukrainian air defense systems Ukraine could move to the border of Crimea, including air defense systems
recently sent by NATO’s Slovakia.
Russia has its
own advanced air-defense
systems in Crimea, so airstrikes would be difficult and risky for Ukraine. Thus, a siege to soften up the Russians before a ground assault would make the most sense, as the Russian troops will begin feeling it over the course of the siege, which would further weaken morale and combat effectiveness before that assault would come. If Ukraine can neutralize Russian air defenses during the course of the campaign, it could then utilize aircraft with far less risk to help finish the job.
The Siege of Crimea would weaken whatever resistance the Russian troops there—unable to be reinforced or resupplied by land or sea and not able to get much from the air if anything—would be able to offer, and when Ukraine does attack, it can use its more advanced, more precise, and heavier weapons it is now getting or about to get from the West.
It is true that
most Crimeans are ethnic Russians
who supported Russia’s illegal annexation, with
those disagreeing having been mostly silenced,
suppressed, “
disappeared,”
arrested (even for
displaying the flag of Ukraine),
tortured, or even
killed, especially
journalists,
activists, and
Crimean Tatars (who have
a long history of persecution and
oppression at the hands of Russia). But contrary to the expectations of many of those supporting Russia in Crimea, prosperity did not come to Russian-occupied Crimea; rather,
stagnation,
isolation, and sanctions did, along with a collapse of the tourism industry and an
overall deterioration in the quality of life. The population would have declined were Russia not
moving in large numbers of military, security, and intelligence personnel and their families from Russia to Crimea. Morale among those living in Crimea would likely have been much higher right after the 2014 takeover
than it is now. Ukraine will almost certainly be far more careful than Russians in avoiding civilian casualties, as Russia engages in indiscriminate bombings (or, more accurately,
deliberate) of civilian areas. The people there,
already suffering under
a depressed economy for years, will likely see a further drop in morale during a siege. Many will try to leave, and, unlike the Russians with civilians elsewhere in Ukraine, Ukrainians are near-certain to allow them to do so. For the above reasons, even though pro-Russia sentiment remains high, it is doubtful that many Crimean civilians will want to fight Ukrainians in the way Ukrainians rose up to resist Russians. If Ukraine were to invade, Russian troops weakened by the siege and suffering from low morale and the ubiquitous poor Russian leadership, knowing no reinforcements are coming and having nowhere to retreat to, would likely be defeated relatively quickly.
Losing Crimea Would be Russia’s Most Devastating Loss of the War
The loss of Crimea would be a devastating blow to not only morale for the Russian military, it would be
quite substantive: one of its main bases in the region, including
the main base of
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, would be in Ukrainian hands. Perhaps even more importantly, it would—
as I have previously argued—shatter Russians’ confidence in their incompetent Putin: the retaking of Crimea was a great source of pride and their faith and confidence in him, and, regardless of what nonsense,
mindless propaganda is thrown at them by Russian state television, losing Crimea would make it painfully obvious...