Yet Another Civil War Thread, Command Edition

#1
J

JTrainDavis

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#1
I want to see if this can get going, A 1 v. 1 choice, but give good reason why you make your selection, it should make for good discussion if we can have 10 or so people contributing. Upon finishing your post, feel free to add another one to the conversation, just cut and paste from above as needed to keep the thread somewhat organized, so folks know what you're talking about...

Start here, for ease,
Grant Vs. Lee
 
#2
#2
I'm going to side with Marse Robert, I look at this as the Minnesota Twins vs the Yankees or Red Sox. He had a smaller budget, and stayed in the game.

Lee consistantly out-generalled every commander that was put in from of the Army of Northern Virginia, and made several ballsey manouvers in front of Grant, often to great effect. Grant, to his credit, was a bulldog. He realized that his casualties could be replaced (for the time) instantly, whereas 1 casualty for Lee was 1 man that couldn't be replaced. His dogged determination is admirable, but the losses at Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and the North Anna Campaign, though strategic victories, were results of hard-headed resolve, and knowledge of the fact that Lee couldn't replace the boys.

Lee's greatest fault, was that he failed to strike the decisive blow. At Malvern Hill, he could have cut off the James with his Artillery, and let McClellen sit tight on the hill, sinking his Navy, which would have been a Coup D'etat for the Army of the Potomac. At Chancellorsville, had he launched a full line assault when the 11th Corps collapsed, he might have captured most of the AoP. He was still close, if not for the quick thinking of the Federal Corps commanders, who got their units across the Rappohannock safely
 
#3
#3
Wow, I cannot believe you are going to make me do this.

If I had to choose between the two, I would go with Grant.

Why?

Grant was adaptable to his situation. Throughout all of his campaigns he adapted to what was around him. He understood strategy and somehow made it simple and practical.

Lee on the other hand had one thing on his mind; he had to create another Cannae. Lee never swayed from this strategy, it was absolutely all or nothing which is why he gambled and disregarded textbook strategy time and time again.
 
#4
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OrangeEmpire said:
Wow, I cannot believe you are going to make me do this.
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Oh, but i did. I see where you are coming from on your assesment of Grant, but my personal preference would be for a Field Commander with a sense of daring and panache, to make great things from a situation where nothing giid was expected.

Grant is to Generalship what Arturo Gatti is to boxing, the willingness to take 4 square hooks to the jaw in order to land 1 uppercut to the body. He won the war, but the way that he did it, to me, was no more than the willingness to butcher his soldiers. But, he did win.
 
#5
#5
Oh yes, the two most written about Generals of the CW!
Being a southerner, I prefer to read more books on southern Generals. I also read a lot on CW battles and have been to quite a few reenactments in the area: VA/PA/MD.

I live in northern VA and am only 1.5 hours from Gettysburg, over 1 hour to Antietam, 2 hours to Richmond and 4 hours to Appomattox. Can't beat that for proximity.
 
#6
#6
JTrainDavis said:
I'm going to side with Marse Robert, I look at this as the Minnesota Twins vs the Yankees or Red Sox. He had a smaller budget, and stayed in the game.

Lee consistantly out-generalled every commander that was put in from of the Army of Northern Virginia, and made several ballsey manouvers in front of Grant, often to great effect. Grant, to his credit, was a bulldog. He realized that his casualties could be replaced (for the time) instantly, whereas 1 casualty for Lee was 1 man that couldn't be replaced. His dogged determination is admirable, but the losses at Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and the North Anna Campaign, though strategic victories, were results of hard-headed resolve, and knowledge of the fact that Lee couldn't replace the boys.

Lee's greatest fault, was that he failed to strike the decisive blow. At Malvern Hill, he could have cut off the James with his Artillery, and let McClellen sit tight on the hill, sinking his Navy, which would have been a Coup D'etat for the Army of the Potomac. At Chancellorsville, had he launched a full line assault when the 11th Corps collapsed, he might have captured most of the AoP. He was still close, if not for the quick thinking of the Federal Corps commanders, who got their units across the Rappohannock safely
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I think Lee's failure to push the issue on Day 1 of Gettysburg was probably the most fatal error.
 
#7
#7
If we are going to get right down to it the best chance for Lee to destroy a field army was at Second Manassas.

As I have disucussed before, it would not have mattered one bit if Lee would have destroyed a field army.

The only the the South wins, is if Lincoln is not re-elected.
 
#8
#8
JTrainDavis said:
Oh, but i did. I see where you are coming from on your assesment of Grant, but my personal preference would be for a Field Commander with a sense of daring and panache, to make great things from a situation where nothing giid was expected.

Grant is to Generalship what Arturo Gatti is to boxing, the willingness to take 4 square hooks to the jaw in order to land 1 uppercut to the body. He won the war, but the way that he did it, to me, was no more than the willingness to butcher his soldiers. But, he did win.
Click to expand...

Lee did not butcher his soldiers?

:thumbsup:
 
#9
#9
OrangeEmpire said:
Lee did not butcher his soldiers?

:thumbsup:
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Well, there is definately no absolutes there, as Lee did send his Army into some spots that they had no business going in to. But nothing akin to the overland march from the Wilderness to the North Anna. Of course, history is thought of in the eye of the beholder, nobody is particularly right or wrong here..

How about Hooker & Hood?
 
#10
#10
JTrainDavis said:
Well, there is definately no absolutes there, as Lee did send his Army into some spots that they had no business going in to. But nothing akin to the overland march from the Wilderness to the North Anna. Of course, history is thought of in the eye of the beholder, nobody is particularly right or wrong here..

How about Hooker & Hood?
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Call me crazy, but I think this one is a no brainer. I will go with Hooker on this one.

Hooker, even though he had many downfalls, Hooker was a skillful commander. No one but Hooker can tell what happened when he learned that Jackson was at the exit of the Wilderness. Hooker out generaled Lee with the pincer movement into the Wilderness but failed to capitalize on his gain. Grant basically bullied Lee into submission.

Hood was a wonderful subordinate but he did not have the skill to lead an independent command. This is completely evident when he took over as the Commander of the Army of Tennessee.
 
#11
#11
OrangeEmpire said:
Call me crazy, but I think this one is a no brainer. I will go with Hooker on this one.

Hooker, even though he had many downfalls, Hooker was a skillful commander. No one but Hooker can tell what happened when he learned that Jackson was at the exit of the Wilderness. Hooker out generaled Lee with the pincer movement into the Wilderness but failed to capitalize on his gain. Grant basically bullied Lee into submission.

Hood was a wonderful subordinate but he did not have the skill to lead an independent command. This is completely evident when he took over as the Commander of the Army of Tennessee.
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OE, you might have said it best, but you didn't.

Both were great Commanders, though they were those who performed best under someone elses guidance.

You mention Chancellorsville, which, if not for a rebel shell shattering a door frame above Hooker's head, would have been his best battle, but it became his worst. Hooker was brilliant in command of the 1st Corps, and served VERY notably in the western campaign. He was a great leader of men, and, with with the exception of Meade, Hancock, Reynolds, and Sedgewick, commanded a corps of the AoP as well as anyone could have hoped.

But thinking that his feint against the Fredricksburg works would force Lee into inactivity was foolhardy. He should have learned that Lee was one to slip the cuffs. Had he temporarily ceded command, there is a good chance that the war ended here.

Hood was a totally different animal. He was Lee's Airedale Terrier, strong and manically loyal. His record as a Division Commander is generally unrivaled, his "out front" style and willingness to face fire led the boys from the 1st Corps, ANVa, to glory that possibly no division before or since has earned. But, following the wounds at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, Davis made a fatal error, (ANOTHER BOXING ANALOGY), Going with the Knockout Artist Hood, in place of the outsized, but faster skilled counterpuncher, Joe Johnston.

The tragic path from Peachtree Creek to Nashville, i blame on 2 things. 1, Hood's natural aggressiveness, both from his psyche, and that there were very few times that Longstreet's Wing/Corps sat on their hands.

The other reason is the Laudanum or Morphine that Hood was surely addicted to after his wounds. I blame this on his 'punishing' of Stewart's and Cheatam' corps at Franklin as a result of their not completing the attack at Spring Hill. Nashville is also a combination of both.

Overall, "Fighting" Joe, would command a Division or Corps in my army before Hood, though every great army needs a Hood.
 
#12
#12
JTrainDavis said:
OE, you might have said it best, but you didn't.

Both were great Commanders, though they were those who performed best under someone elses guidance.

You mention Chancellorsville, which, if not for a rebel shell shattering a door frame above Hooker's head, would have been his best battle, but it became his worst. Hooker was brilliant in command of the 1st Corps, and served VERY notably in the western campaign. He was a great leader of men, and, with with the exception of Meade, Hancock, Reynolds, and Sedgewick, commanded a corps of the AoP as well as anyone could have hoped.

But thinking that his feint against the Fredricksburg works would force Lee into inactivity was foolhardy. He should have learned that Lee was one to slip the cuffs. Had he temporarily ceded command, there is a good chance that the war ended here.

Hood was a totally different animal. He was Lee's Airedale Terrier, strong and manically loyal. His record as a Division Commander is generally unrivaled, his "out front" style and willingness to face fire led the boys from the 1st Corps, ANVa, to glory that possibly no division before or since has earned. But, following the wounds at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, Davis made a fatal error, (ANOTHER BOXING ANALOGY), Going with the Knockout Artist Hood, in place of the outsized, but faster skilled counterpuncher, Joe Johnston.

The tragic path from Peachtree Creek to Nashville, i blame on 2 things. 1, Hood's natural aggressiveness, both from his psyche, and that there were very few times that Longstreet's Wing/Corps sat on their hands.

The other reason is the Laudanum or Morphine that Hood was surely addicted to after his wounds. I blame this on his 'punishing' of Stewart's and Cheatam' corps at Franklin as a result of their not completing the attack at Spring Hill. Nashville is also a combination of both.

Overall, "Fighting" Joe, would command a Division or Corps in my army before Hood, though every great army needs a Hood.
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Agree.....

Couch or Longstreet?
 
#13
#13
Couch is one of, if not, the most under-rated commanders of the War. His command during the Penninsula Campaign and the 7 Days left nothing to be wanted. He ably commanded the II corps through the debacles at Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville, and, being a subordinate, pulled the AoP across the Rappohannock safely as directed to. Whether or not he realized that there was still a major victory to pull from the smashing of the XI Corp's rout is a moot point, as he did what he was told to upon assuming command.

His placement in command of the Department of the Susquehanna(spelling?) shows the faith that was placed in him, as considering Lee was marching fast for the Potomac, the middle of PA was in dire threat, unless the AoP could get on the move. He fought ably in the West, helping Thomas to destroy Hood, and deserves a place in the upper echelon of the Civil War high command.

But not as high as Longstreet. Pete had a body of work rivaled by very few, commanded the 1st Corps in just about every engagement it had in its existance. Cautious, yes, but not as a fault. Well, not as a Corps commander anyhow. There are very few black marks on Longstreet's resume, and those are notably the sieges of Suffolk and Knoxville. Had Longstreet not had been tied down besieging Suffolk, Lee would have had his I Corps to launch fresh into a final knockout punch of the AoP south of the Rappahannock. Knoxville was a relatively unimportant city with a rail hub, the time he spent besieging the town would have been better served by having his manpower in the field army, either in ANVa or AOT.

But he always did what was expected, though at Gettysburg he delayed (so it is magnified, as it occured at the the most microscoped battle in history). Would he have taken the Federal Left on the 2nd had he attacked promptly? Personally, i don't think so, but that is all for naught in 2007.

I take Longstreet, based on similar resumes, i have to go with the larger body of work.
 
#18
#18
I wanted to comment on Couch and Longstreet.

I have stated on the board many times that I am a huge Couch fan. So this ramble just might be filled with personal bias towards him.

Couch was a brilliant commander; I believe his record speaks for it self.

I wanted to focus my choosing of Couch on the battle of Chancellorsville. Even through all the chaos and his commanding general losing all of his nerve he chose to obey orders from Hooker to retreat across the river even after Meade, Reynolds and Sickles urged Couch to take command of the Army and fight. They argued that Couch would be justified disobeying Hooker, because his thought process was not clear, and making an assault on confederate lines. Couch refused and was a military man through and through.

Hancock said it best when he was covering the withdrawl, look at the men, they are not beaten. It is the officers/we that have failed them.

A lot of people dog Longstreet for being slow and being stubborn. While I agree with those statements I understand why he was both of those things.

Longstreet got those attributes from serving in the Mexican-American War. Longstreet saw many men die needlessly because they were thrown into battle too soon after marching or after they men had little or no rest. He was determined not to let his men die unnecessarily. I believe the greatest example of this is during the battle of the Wilderness.

As for his stubbornness it was his greatest attribute and his greatest weakness. If I were in a dog fight and I knew I had ground to work with, I would want Longstreet at my side. Unfortunately, for Lee, this came back to haunt him at Gettysburg when Longstreet grew stubborn and "took his time", his way of defiance, on the second day.
 
#19
#19
therealUT said:
Grant, Hooker, Longstreet
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I'll give props to Grant whenever I can.

If I were able to choose from all the commanders in the Civil War and make an "army" of a commanding general and six corps commanders it would be the following:

Grant Commanding General

Lee I Corps (Attacking Wing)
Jackson II Corps (Attacking Wing)

Couch III Corps (Adapted to their surroundings)
Sherman IV Corps (Adapted to their surroundings)

Hancock V Corps (Dog Fight Wing)
Longstreet VI Corps (Dog Fight Wing)
 
#20
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OE, you are a scholar in the highest degree.

I agree wholeheartedly with you on most points, Couch deserved no blame for the retreat across the Rappahonnock. Those who pointed blame at him afterword were politicking, as Meade was the only Corps Commander who advocated staying south of the river and fighting it out. Consider (to those unfamiliar with the campaign) that withdrawing to the north bank of the Rappahannock consitituted retreat, and forefieting another campaign to Lee. Couch did what he was ordered to, and his bretheren in the AoP High command thought the same.

About Longstreet delaying on July 2nd, i don't know that it would have done any good. Due to Dan Sickles advancing to the Peach Orchard and Wheat Field, and the III Federal Corps fighting like hell, i don't think that any assault against Meade's left would have succeeded on the 2nd, due to the timing and the fates that intervened.

Personally, after the failed assault on the Federal right on the 2nd, if Lee had waited until Pickett's division was up, and sent Hood, McClaws, and Pickett against the Federal left early on the 3rd, he would have carried the day.

But Pete Longstreet never ordered a retreat, he was never the first to leave the field, and nobody can say his divisions/brigades/regiments/companies didn't give their all, dating to the Mexican War at Chapultapec.

Not taking anything from Pickett's division, but had McClaws division been last in line on the march, and led the assault on the 3d, they might have won the day.

I'd love to talk more about this one, so feel free to comment, but how about McClaws and Pickett?
 
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OrangeEmpire said:
I'll give props to Grant whenever I can.

If I were able to choose from all the commanders in the Civil War and make an "army" of a commanding general and six corps commanders it would be the following:

Joe Johnston: Commander in Chief

"Patton" Wing
I Corps: Jackson
II Corps: Sheridan

"Bradley" Wing
III Corps: Lee
IV Corps: Sherman

"MacArthur" Wing

V Corps: Hancock
VI Corps: Uncle John Sedgwick
Click to expand...
 
#22
#22
Honorable mentions to A.P, and D.H. Hill, as i only considered corps commanders on the US level, and LTG's on the CS side. Countless division commanders could have made the list as well, but as the discussion flows, they will surely brought up
 
#23
#23
McClaws or Pickett.......wow, this might be difficult.

Hmmmmm..........

I will go with Lafayette because I believe he was an adequate commander. Nothing more and nothing less.

I believe Lafayette suffered from ups and downs, not necessarily in his own mind, but that of what others/Lee thought about him.

Lee thought he was too slow at Antietam but Lee then praised him for his defensive work at Fredericksburg.

Lee sent to him to check Sedgwick at Chancellorsville but Lee was disappointed that McLaws had not attacked more aggressively and caused more harm to Sedgwick's corps, instead of letting him escape across the Rappahannock.

After Jaskson died Longstreet recommended Lafayette but Lee refused.

Then to top it off for the poor fella Longstreet turned on him blaming the failure of the Knoxville Campaign on him for poor planning.

Now to Pickett............

What did Pickett ever do?

Pickett's first combat command was during the Peninsula Campaign, leading a brigade that was nicknamed the Gamecocks. (The brigade would eventually be led by Richard Garnett in Pickett's Charge.) They performed well at Williamsburg, Seven Pines and Gaines' Mill.

At Gaines' Mill, Pickett was knocked off his horse by a bullet in the shoulder, and although he made an enormous fuss that he was mortally wounded, a staff officer examined the wound and rode away, stating that he was "perfectly able to take care of himself." However, Pickett was out of action for three months on medical leave and his arm would remain stiff for at least a year.

Well I guess I have to mention why we know any thing about Pickett at all.

Lee referred to Pickett as leading the charge (although Longstreet was actually in command), which is one of the reasons that it is generally not known to popular history by the more accurate name "Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault."

Pickett's Charge was a bloodbath. While the Union lost about 1,500 killed and wounded, the Confederate casualty rate was over 50%. Pickett's three brigade commanders and all thirteen of his regimental commanders were casualties. Kemper was wounded and Garnett and Armistead did not survive. Trimble and Pettigrew were the most senior casualties, the former losing a leg and the latter wounded in the hand and dying on the retreat to Virginia. Pickett himself has received some historical criticism for surviving the battle personally unscathed, but his position well to the rear of his troops (probably at the Codori farm on the Emmitsburg Road) was command doctrine at the time for division commanders.

*Note-I will argue that the vast majority of the Confederate soldiers never even made it past the fence line.

Oh yeah, Pickett blew it during the retreat from Petersburg.
 
#24
#24
OrangeEmpire said:
McClaws or Pickett.......wow, this might be difficult.

Hmmmmm..........


Oh yeah, Pickett blew it during the retreat from Petersburg.
Click to expand...

McClaws was an able subordinate, maybe because of the composition of his division, with famous Brigades under Barksdale and Kershaw. Lafayette is an unknown as he served in the shadow of the Giants of the Confederacy, he was ready and able to fight, only lacking opportunity.

Pickett is remembered only for the assault on the 3d of July, though i only quoted part of your post for a reason. While the ANVa was collapsing from the Petersburg works, Pickett was in the rear, at a shad bake.

Pickett is an unfortunate figure in a way, fate putting him in command of the majority of the troops who made the charge that the plebian books say was the turning point of the war. So the charge that bears his name was only his because he was last in the marching order of the army, and thus was the only fresh division Lee had left.
 
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