Although the French eventually contributed nearly ten divisions to the Allied effort, in the process taking 23,500 dead and 95,000 wounded between the Tunisian campaign of 1943 and the surrender of Germany in May 1945, they languished in a chasm of Allied contempt for the remainder of the war. Insults among Allies, real and imagined, too numerous to chronicle, were to characterize the remainder of the campaign and pursue the three Western allies into Italy. Eisenhower's way of dealing with incidents of inter-Allied friction was to force miscreants to apologize, while allowing Alexander to relegate U.S. forces to demeaning auxiliary tasks. This so incensed Marshall that he intervened to force Eisenhower to allocate Second Corps a greater role in the final conquest of Tunisia.
The problem could only be solved once Eisenhower convinced the Americans in his command that "this is not a child's game." Alexander's well-meaning but patronizing attempts to establish "battle schools" where British officers trained U.S. units, to assign British liaison officers to American command posts, and to send detailed instructions to U.S. units about how to conduct operations were deeply resented by the Americans. Clearly, the United States Army would have to get its act together on its own. General Leonard Gerow, training infantry replacements in Scotland, was told by his longtime friend Eisenhower to "ruthlessly weed out" inadequate officers. Eisenhower's most dramatic gesture was temporarily to transfer General George Patton from organizing the Seventh Army in Morocco "long enough to kick II Corps in the butt and lead it into its initial battles as a corps."
"Kicking butt" was the activity of choice for the autocratic, flamboyant, frequently coarse, pistol-packing Patton.