Rasputin_Vol
"Slava Ukraina"
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Dick & Ronnie & God & Gorby
Reagan and Gorbachev sat down in Iceland on October 11 and 12, 1986, for what turned out to be one of the most tumultuous summits of the entire Cold War. Reagan flew into the meeting against a backdrop of the usual admonitions in the United States that Gorbachev represented nothing new for Soviet foreign policy. “He was a protégé of Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, and Mikhail Suslov, then chief party ideologue,” wrote Henry Kissinger. “Neither of these men was likely to have been a closet dove.” In Reykjavik, however, Gorbachev departed from the Soviet past by offering a startling package of proposals on arms control; these represented a series of concessions toward the American positions. Gorbachev suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union cut by half their strategic weapons, including heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. He also proposed that the two countries eliminate all their intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
By the time of Nixon’s clandestine visit to the White House, Reagan and his top aides, including Shultz and the chief of staff, Howard Baker, were incensed—not at the Soviets, but at high-level criticism on the home front. Nixon and Kissinger, the architects of détente with the Soviet Union, were now giving credibility, in widely discussed articles, to the argument that Reagan was being seduced by Gorbachev. Frank Carlucci, the national-security adviser, recommended that the president meet, separately, with Nixon and Kissinger. Reagan quickly rejected Kissinger, his principal political target and adversary of the mid-1970s. Nixon, however, was different; Reagan would not say no to a former president.
Once settled into a soft chair alongside Reagan in the White House residence, with Baker and Carlucci looking on, Nixon seized the initiative. He said he realized the administration was unhappy with the public criticism, but he and Kissinger were sincere. The thrust of Nixon’s message was that Reagan should be more hawkish in dealing with Gorbachev. At one point, according to Nixon’s private notes from the session, Nixon told Reagan that a deal with the Soviets would not really help Reagan’s standing with the American public. Polls showed that military action helps a president far more than diplomacy does, Nixon said. “I pointed out that many people felt my popularity had gone up because of my trip to China. In fact, it had improved only slightly. What really sent it up was the bombing and mining of Haiphong.”
Nixon’s broader complaint was that any agreement to remove missiles from Europe would leave the Soviet Union with a large advantage in conventional military forces. Reagan pointed out that in his face-to-face conversations with Gorbachev, the Soviet leader had seemed sincere in his desire to reduce Soviet military power, including conventional forces. Gorbachev had said he didn’t want to continue the unending arms race between the two superpowers. Nixon thought Reagan was naïve to believe Gorbachev. He wrote in his subsequent memo that this part of his conversation with Reagan was “somewhat disturbing.”