The book that might end every discussion on Volnation.

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daj2576

@aVolForLife
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#1
Let me see if I can get your attention. What might fans of the Chicago Cubs and the Tennessee Volunteers have in common? To restate this question another way, what if our rabid and largely stable fan base actually has disincentivized the Tennessee Athletic Department from making good decisions over the past decade? More on that later.

As I begin to write this, I know that the vast majority of those reading will end right about here. Many of those will go on to put something along the lines of "too long, didn't read" or "nerd" or whatever else. That's fine, but for those of you who continue on, who like to parse and understand the data driving the things you love, and be challenged in your position, please continue reading.

Many of my posts on this site have been about the numerical impact of talent on the outcome of football games. There are generally two distinct conclusions that I have drawn from the data. The first is that talent is the major contributor to about 70% of the wins on the field, and the second is that coaching is one of the most over-valued aspects of a team's success (only part of the remaining 30% can be attributed to coaching). These findings rocked my world.

In that vein, I tend to be attracted to information that is more informative as opposed to speculative. Sadly, so much of the information that sports enthusiasts are given is the latter and not the former. If you read message boards, listen to sports talk, or even watch games, you are pelted with traditional views, that are largely nonsense.

If you have read Freakonomics or perhaps even Moneyball (watching either movie doesn't really count), you will love this book I just finished reading (and my sincerest apologies if this has been brought up previously).

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Written and researched by economists, who also love sports, the information in this book truly pulls the veil back on many modern day fan-fictions. Here, in no particular order, is an non-exhaustive list of some of the topics covered.

First: Is defense really the key to championships? Nope, as intuitive as it is to say, offense is just as important, if not more so, in every major sport.

Second: Is home field advantage due to crowd enthusiasm and support? Nope, not in the way most fans think.

Third: Does icing the kicker work? Nope.

Fourth: Is punting really as valuable as modern coaching and fan perception would lead you to believe? Nope. In fact, going for it on 4th down (outside of a few exceptions) is a far better statistical option if you want to actually win a game, than kicking a punt or a field goal.

Now, back to the Cubs v. Volunteers question from the beginning. Buried deep in the last chapter is the revelation that for most teams, wins and losses effect fan attendance at games. Fan attendance directly equates to income. Income, if turned back into the team, directly equates to wins (those who tend to spend more, tend to have more success). So, for most teams, keeping a quality product on the field is the way to generate income. Or to put it another way, if you want to make money, put a quality product on the field, and the fans will come and you will make more money. Except for the Chicago Cubs.

For whatever reason, the Cubs have spent years of being mediocre and the fans still buy over 90% of the seats thus insulating the team from the impact of mediocrity while removing any incentive for the management to invest more money to assure a winning team.

For any of you who believe that UT doesn't spend money to make quality coaching hires (disregard the fact that I actually believe coaches are worth far less than what they currently command on the market due to their impact on the outcome of most games being far inferior to talent) do you think that it could possibly be because our fans tend to be incredibly loyal? When have we ever seen Neyland at 15% attendance, or even 50% for that matter? As a hypothetical question, could it be that our fans actually allow the AD, or any of those who are in charge, to make decisions that could actually make Tennessee less competitive over the long run?

So it seems that the bottom line might be that if you want a more competitive team, ride a bandwagon.

Food for thought and a great book.

Now, own to my next project...

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#2
#2
You bring up some very good points. There is a HS coach in Ark (Pulaski Academy) that never punts. He's done the math and statistically, he's correct. He also:

On-side kicks every chance he gets. One game his team was up 29-0 before their opponent ran an offensive play.

Rarely, if ever, allows his punt returners to return a punt. They fair-catch or let it go. Statistically, it isn't worth a fumble.

This coach said college coaches speak with him all the time and most say that they would be fired if they coached that way in college. On 4th down you're supposed to punt.
 
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#3
#3
You bring up some very good points. There is a HS coach in Ark (Pulaski Academy) that never punts. He's done the math and statistically, he's correct. He also:

On-side kicks every chance he gets. One game his team was up 29-0 before their opponent ran an offensive play.

Rarely, if ever, allows his punt returners to return a punt. They fair-catch or let it go. Statistically, it isn't worth a fumble.

This coach said college coaches speak with him all the time and most say that they would be fired if they coached that way in college. On 4th down you're supposed to punt.

His last name is Kelley, although his first eludes me right now, and there is almost a whole chapter devoted to some of his stuff. It truly is amazing.

The authors of the book also address your last paragraph in great detail across all sports. Specifically they use Bellicheck as an example. He is one of the more aggressive coaches who tends to use some of these theories, but even he isn't immune to severe criticism when he goes-for-it and it fails (even if he goes for it three other times, and it works). It is basically proof that most people don't understand cost-benefit analysis, and that fans/owners are afraid of change that departs from what "they know" to be correct.
 
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#4
#4
His last name is Kelley, although his first eludes me right now, and there is almost a whole chapter devoted to some of his stuff. It truly is amazing.

It's fascinating to read things like this. I'm going to hunt those 2 books down. Thanks for sharing.

The "anti" to your Cubs point are the Tampa Bay Rays. They win, and still no one goes to the games. However, the dome isn't in the best location but the team has great TV numbers.
 
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#5
#5
I think a coach might take more chances if he believes in the talent on the field or sidelines. It's pretty simple talent wins more ( not all ) games. I'll give the coach at least 30%.
 
#6
#6
Personally I think 50% of what I just read is wrong. You don't bring a synopsis of a game and structured averages into a game of inches where decisions made at a particular moment in time do not address nothing less than non-nuclear warfare.....Well hell I guess on second thought you really do. However the law of averages diminishes as thousands of split second decisions on and of the field play out. It does not allow for happenstance and circumstance and murphy's law. There's a whole lot of events above and below a simplified average.
 
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#7
#7
It's fascinating to read things like this. I'm going to hunt those 2 books down. Thanks for sharing.

The "anti" to your Cubs point are the Tampa Bay Rays. They win, and still no one goes to the games. However, the dome isn't in the best location but the team has great TV numbers.

The book touches on Tampa Bay briefly, but uses the White Sox as the argument of a team that is the most closely related to success and attendance. There point still remains that the MLB average of what they call "attendance elasticity to winning" is almost a 1 to 1 ratio.

Have you read Freakonomics? That is a mind blower too, and might better prepare you for reading this book as they are very similar in style and substance.

Oh, another great point the authors make is how the NFL overtime system is fatally flawed. Something like 85% of all NFL overtime games are simply won by the team who wins the coin toss and goes on offense first.
 
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#8
#8
The "anti" to your Cubs point are the Tampa Bay Rays. They win, and still no one goes to the games. However, the dome isn't in the best location but the team has great TV numbers.

The location isn't as bad as the stadium itself. Worst baseball venue I've ever seen.
 
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#9
#9
Personally I think 50% of what I just read is wrong. You don't bring a synopsis of a game and structured averages into a game of inches where decisions made at a particular moment in time do not address nothing less than non-nuclear warfare.....Well hell I guess on second thought you really do. However the law of averages diminishes as thousands of split second decisions on and of the field play out. It does not allow for happenstance and circumstance and murphy's law. There's a whole lot of events above and below a simplified average.

Drawing conclusions while using incorrect data and understanding is, ironically, exactly what this book is about. Most, if not all, of your arguments are addressed with overwhelming data. I admit that sometimes I found myself questioning their methodology, but that was rare.

If you like numbers, statistics, or just understanding sports, there really is no excuse not to read it. You can get a used copy for less than a dollar (plus shipping and handling), on Amazon.
 
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#10
#10
The location isn't as bad as the stadium itself. Worst baseball venue I've ever seen.

It's just the roof with the rings. From a seating standpoint it's hard to get any closer to the field.
 
#11
#11
Have you read Freakonomics? That is a mind blower too, and might better prepare you for reading this book as they are very similar in style and substance.

Is that written by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner?
 
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#12
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#13
#13
too long, didn't read, nerd.

just kidding, i read it, and it was informative. especially the part where it backs up my strong love of going for it on 4th down.
 
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#14
#14
too long, didn't read, nerd.

just kidding, i read it, and it was informative. especially the part where it backs up my strong love of going for it on 4th down.

If you like not going for it on 4th, there is a whole chapter devoted to that. I can't say it enough, it's a great read. Totally worth your time.

I feel like Lavar Burton. lol
 

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#15
#15
There are too many variables in play to make a definitive statement about being better off punting or going for it. I can see your odds of winning increasing with going on 4th down if your punter and your defense are garbage. However, if your defense is capable and you have a punter that can switch field position, the odds of your defense giving up a 90 yard drive is far less than the odds of conducting a TD drive where you are forced to go for it on 4th down one or more times. As far as field goals are concerned, if you get inside the opponent's 40 yard line and you have Sebastian Janikowski, you damn well better kick a field goal on 4th down. If you have Daniel Lincoln, you may want to reconsider. These decisions in these situations are always dependent on multiple variables and can't be summed up with some law of averages nonsense.
 
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#16
#16
#17
#17
So you are saying our loyalty as a fan base works counter to the goal of winning championships?

Awesome.

I actually agree with that premise. Although I would offer that the fans helped with Fulmer's ouster.
 
#18
#18
There are too many variables in play to make a definitive statement about being better off punting or going for it. I can see your odds of winning increasing with going on 4th down if your punter and your defense are garbage. However, if your defense is capable and you have a punter that can switch field position, the odds of your defense giving up a 90 yard drive is far less than the odds of conducting a TD drive where you are forced to go for it on 4th down one or more times. As far as field goals are concerned, if you get inside the opponent's 40 yard line and you have Sebastian Janikowski, you damn well better kick a field goal on 4th down. If you have Daniel Lincoln, you may want to reconsider. These decisions in these situations are always dependent on multiple variables and can't be summed up with some law of averages nonsense.

Here are a brief summary of the conclusions from a 2005 study, included in the book, done by an economist from Cal-Berkeley. This is using NFL data.

-Inside the opponent's 45-yard line, facing anything less than fourth and eight, teams are better off going for it than punting.
-inside the opponent's 33-yard line, they are better off going for it on anything less than fourth and 11.*
-regardless of field position, on anything less than fourth and five, teams are ALWAYS better off going for it.

*the exception: if little time remains and a field goal would decide the game.

To understand the methodology behind those numbers takes several pages of the book. All I can do is just point you to the chapter titled "Go For It" and let you read it yourself. Whether you ultimately agree or disagree, I think you will find it interesting, if not compelling.
 
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#19
#19
I have read both and enjoyed them thoroughly.

Then Scorecasting is a must read. It is basically the same stuff, all turned towards sports. There seems to be a heavy emphasis on baseball but that might be because I don't really like baseball and wanted to read more about football.
 
#20
#20
Here are a brief summary of the conclusions from a 2005 study, included in the book, done by an economist from Cal-Berkeley. This is using NFL data.

-Inside the opponent's 45-yard line, facing anything less than fourth and eight, teams are better off going for it than punting.

Depends on how good your defense is and who your punter is

-inside the opponent's 33-yard line, they are better off going for it on anything less than fourth and 11.*

Depends on how good your defense is and how good your field goal kicker is

-regardless of field position, on anything less than fourth and five, teams are ALWAYS better off going for it.

Depends on how good your defense and punter are and how bad your offense is.

*the exception: if little time remains and a field goal would decide the game.

To understand the methodology behind those numbers takes several pages of the book. All I can do is just point you to the chapter titled "Go For It" and let you read it yourself. Whether you ultimately agree or disagree, I think you will find it interesting, if not compelling.

These numbers work when you're talking about some grey non entity such as "Teams". However, in a football matchup, there are usually weaknesses and strengths that individual teams have. It would be silly for a team with a 3rd string QB and a bunch of soft pansies on the O line to go for it on 4th and 11 rather than kicking a field goal with an all pro kicker. Also. If you are faced with fourth and 8 at the 45 and you have the best defense in football and a kicker than can pin it inside the five, you are an idiot if you go for it. These numbers are interesting to consider when you are looking at the aggregate of every single team combined, but in matchups where one team might have a strength or weakness relative to an opponent, these numbers are useless.
 
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#21
#21
So you are saying our loyalty as a fan base works counter to the goal of winning championships?

Awesome.

I actually agree with that premise. Although I would offer that the fans helped with Fulmer's ouster.

Maybe. As the authors of this, and Freakonomics point out, life is about incentives. If fans participate regardless of success, then there is no incentive to spend in a way that increases the chances for success. At least that is the well reasoned argument in this book.

Of course the question could be: well if fans don't participate, where would the money come from to spend to create the on-field success? I can't answer that.
 
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#22
#22
Also, if the defnese knows that you are going to go for it on every fourth down, that drastically alters defenseive play calling strategy leading up to 4th down. If teams started going for it more on 4th down, I suspect we would see a surprising amount of conversions at first. Once coaches adjusted play calling tactics, that conversion rate would likely come down drastically.
 
#24
#24
These numbers work when you're talking about some grey non entity such as "Teams". However, in a football matchup, there are usually weaknesses and strengths that individual teams have. It would be silly for a team with a 3rd string QB and a bunch of soft pansies on the O line to go for it on 4th and 11 rather than kicking a field goal with an all pro kicker. Also. If you are faced with fourth and 8 at the 45 and you have the best defense in football and a kicker than can pin it inside the five, you are an idiot if you go for it. These numbers are interesting to consider when you are looking at the aggregate of every single team combined, but in matchups where one team might have a strength or weakness relative to an opponent, these numbers are useless.

I really think you should read the book. You are arguing against everything that is addressed there. I can't scribe whole chapters of the book to present the argument with all of the data and intertwined views.

I will quote this. In that paper that I cited above, the author states that:
"..play calling of NFL teams shows "systematic and clear cut" departures from the decisions that would maximize their changes of winning. Based on data from more than 700 NFL games, [the author] identified 1,068 fourth-down situations in which, statistically speaking, the right call would have been to go for it. The NFL teams punted 959 times. In other words, nearly 90% of the time, NFL coaches made the sub-optimal choice."

Now, I am sure you are asking if this stuff is so clear cut, why doesn't anyone use it. The answer is because most people think about football, including coaches and managers/owners, just like you do. There is a prevailing wisdom, no matter how incorrect, that is totally risk-averse (the risk being change). Seriously, this whole book is dedicated to debunking some of the same things you are saying.
 
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#25
#25
Also, if the defnese knows that you are going to go for it on every fourth down, that drastically alters defenseive play calling strategy leading up to 4th down. If teams started going for it more on 4th down, I suspect we would see a surprising amount of conversions at first. Once coaches adjusted play calling tactics, that conversion rate would likely come down drastically.

To the point that is in bold: you agree with the authors, then?

Are you then suggesting that coaches shouldn't do what gives them the statistical advantage because at some point in the future that would be minimized when other people figure it out?

The beautiful thing is that at that point, somewhere in the future, there would be other ways to statistically maximize success.
 
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